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ABSTRACT
ETHNIC PARTY BANS AND CIVIL UNREST: A MEASUREMENT MODELING
APPROACH TO PREDICTING EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING
by
Kelly A. Gleason
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Dave Armstrong
Political representation through exclusively ethnic parties has long been thought to create,
or enforce, social cleavages leading to conflict. To gain support and mobilize ethnic constituents, ethnic party leadership has incentive to exaggerate differences between, or even
antagonize, members of other ethnic groups through the process of ethnic outbidding. Classic political theory cautions that the exclusive nature of ethnic parties can also produce
a dangerous zero sum game between ethnic groups that cannot be solved by compromise
via democratic institutions. Several institutional solutions have been proposed to counter
the problem of instability ethnic divisions create for new democracies, encountering varying levels of success. Constitutional ethnic party bans are designed with the intention of
coercing ethnic groups to form inclusive, multiethnic political parties. Party membership,
then, takes on a national, rather than communal, character, which is thought to prevent
extremism and encourage moderate political parties. Opponents of this method of party
regulation argue that prohibiting ethnic groups from forming parties obstructs advancement
of interests exclusive to the ethnic group and that this practice is especially repressive for
ethnic minorities. The theory I present in this dissertation makes the case that ethnic party
bans, in the form of constitutional party regulations with spatial distribution requirements,
instead prevent majority ethnic groups from resorting to extremism by restricting parties
to compete in elections only when the party has diverse membership. To garner support
across ethnic cleavages, through a kind of party-level federalism, party leaders are compelled
to moderate political platforms in order to form winning coalitions. I argue that this institutional arrangement is not only effective at reducing conflict, but that the design is more
stabilizing than power-sharing or proportional representation. To date, there is no consensus on whether the risk of unrest is heightened by ethnic party competition or subsequently
dampened by the banning of ethnic party participation in politics. Recent empirical inquiries
into the relationship between ethnic parties, or banned ethnic party activity, and conflict
have returned contradictory results. Some of the discrepancy in findings can be attributed
to differing approaches to research design. In particular, in Ishiyama’s 2011 study his mixed
findings indicate that in certain statistical models ethnic parties are more prone to conflict
whereas utilizing alternative modeling strategies, there is no apparent relationship. I argue
that the problem requires a deeper inquiry into measurement attributes of the data which can
offer insight into the selection of appropriate modeling techniques. My research deals with
this measurement problem by utilizing alternating least squares optimal scaling (ALSOS)
ii

regression to effectively transform the ordinal dependent variable to its least biased linear
form. As an added attempt to reduce endogeneity, I employ causal inference techniques to
stratify a sample of most similar cases between ethnic groups with parties, without parties,
and those who have been banned from party operation. This scaling solution will both
improve this particular model of ethnic conflict and demonstrate the value of ALSOS regression in myriad social science applications. The analysis follows with discussion of several
cases of constitutional ethnic party bans, examining the specific features of the institution
that prove most useful. I find that constitutional ethnic party bans are an effective tool in
the prevention of ethnic outbidding. Ethnic groups banned from forming exclusively ethnic
parties engage in lower levels of unrest as compared to groups with ethnic parties. I also
show that bans with spatial distribution requirements work well to facilitate minority ethnic
group representation within multiethnic parties and that bans are less effective in countries
with already well-established ethnic parties.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
New democracies are notoriously vulnerable to conflict in societies with deeply rooted ethnic
cleavages

1

(Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985). Politicization of ethnic divisions in the form

of exclusively ethnic parties is thought to make matters worse. To combat this threat,
institutional engineering is increasingly employed by governments and international actors
alike in efforts to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict between ethnic groups. One popular
method of institutional design implemented to reduce unrest is the constitutional ban on
exclusively ethnic party formation/participation (VanBiezen, 2008; Birnir, 2004; Bogaards,
2008). In SubSaharan Africa, for instance, ethnic party bans have been instituted to prevent
further ethnic fractionalization within government, as well as in Eastern Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East (Basedau and Moroff, 2011). By reducing the propensity toward ethnic
conflict the larger goal of preventing the politicization of ethnicity is to protect the stability
of fragile new democracies. Though, paradoxically, limiting ethnic groups from political
participation violates the very democratic tenets the bans attempt to uphold. That is, in
order to enable true democracy, institutions must ensure that no group is denied the ability
to participate in government indefinitely(Birnir, 2008; Dahl, 1998, 1971).
Well-established theoretical inquiries have demonstrated that the inception of ethic,
or exclusive particularist, political parties has the potential to aggravate existing tensions
between ethnic groups leading to increased protest and conflict (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka
and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1977; Snyder, 2000; Reilly, 2006). Essentially, ethnic parties
1

This is especially true for countries with ethnic cleavages that have led to prior unrest.

1

form with the same type of goals as secular political parties. Formation occurs, first and
foremost, as a vehicle for politicians to become elected to government offices(Aldrich, 1995).
Parties, as brands, offer cues to voters on policy position and, ostensibly, represent supporters
by advancing these policies. Ethnic party identification offers an even stronger cue than nonidentity based parties due to the ascriptive nature of group membership, which is especially
helpful in environments where there is a dearth of information. The problem lies in the
exclusivity of the party and the selective benefits it purports to secure for its members. All
parties attempt to maintain support by offering benefits to its members, however in plural
societies these gains are often (at least perceived to be) zero sum. Not only does this inhibit
cooperation between ethnic groups but it also produces incentives for party leaders to take
on more radical agendas in order to produce the most gains for the group (sometimes in the
form of losses for a rival group)(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Horowitz, 1985). Ethnic party
leadership may also create deeper cleavages and resentments between groups as their drive
to garner support places exaggerated emphasis on the salience of ethnicity and its historical
narratives (real or imagined).
Implications of the theory suggest that countries can benefit from establishing ethnic
party bans to protect these fragile regimes. Banning ethnic parties prior to formation is
hoped to cancel out harmful effects of party competition along ethnic lines. Theoretically,
the idea is to force citizens to seek representation from a party that is more socially inclusive
to other groups. This way, parties will build platforms on pertinent issues appealing to
overlapping segments of civil society (Lijphart, 1977). However, a growing body of literature
contends that ethnic bans do little to alleviate tensions and may even create hostile conditions
conducive to greater unrest (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010; Basedau and Moroff,
2011; Birnir, 2008). Furthermore, in some cases, bans have been abused as a tool to reduce
competition among parties that may challenge the current regime (Birnir, 2007b; Schedler,
2002; Basedau and Moroff, 2011).
The first empirical work conducted to explore the association between ethnic parties and

2

conflict produces mixed results (Ishiyama, 2009). When included in a full ordered logit model
to predict ordinal levels of conflict, Ishiyama (2009) finds that presence of an ethnic party
is significantly associated with increased levels of both violence and protest. However, when
analyzing the relationship with t-tests of means (treating the ordinal variable as continuous),
ethnic parties do not have a significant impact on violence. Basedau and Moroff (2011)
conduct a quantitative analysis examining the impact of strictly implemented ethnic party
bans on several types of country-level conflict, finding that implemented bans neither reduce
nor increase violence in most cases.
Presently, there are no studies that compare levels of violence between ethnic groups
represented by particularist parties and those with party bans. Until this is sorted out, it
remains unclear whether the development of ethnic parties should be concerning, and if so,
whether or not placing a ban on party formation will do more harm than good. In both
studies, the effects ethnic parties and ethnic party bans have on conflict have been assessed
separately. The inquiry I present in this dissertation sets out to explore the relationship
between ethnic parties, party bans, and civil unrest.

1.1

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework from which the foundation of my research is built is a revisitation of Rabushka and Shepsle’s 1972 collective choice theory of democracy in a plural
society, extended to explore the effects of constitutional bans of ethnic party activity. While
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) is widely regarded as the seminal reference on ethnic party
behavior, specifically as it pertains to processes of ethnic outbidding, current literature on
the subject has virtually abandoned the original views laid out in this work. Chandra (2005,
236) attributes the move away from the theory to a problematic core assumption, namely,
the tendency to characterize ethnicity as “fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics”.
Chandra argues that this assumption is characteristic of primordialism, which conceptually
establishes ethnicity is a predominant, unchanging aspect of individual identity, whereas

3

modern constructivists regard ethnicity as a more fluid, socially-constructed aspect of an
individual, ascriptive yet not inherently determinant of group affiliation. In her 2005 article,
Chandra (2005) adopts the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model building on the assumption
that individuals can have multiple ethnic affiliations and that at any time the salience of
these identifiers can change. Furthermore, her theory describes how institutional arrangements can create more multidimensional ethnic affiliations, suggesting that “fixity is not an
intrinsic quality of ethnic identities but a product of the institutional context in which ethnic
groups are politicized”(Chandra, 2005, 236).
Chandra argues that institutions designed to promote and facilitate multiple dimensions
of ethnic identity can reduce the polarization that occurs through politicizing ethnicity and
potentially solve the problem of ethnic outbidding. Her demonstrative case is India, where
there are several cross-cutting social cleavages overlapping along the identity lines of language, region, caste, class, and religion. This kind of social organization lends itself to the
creation of smaller identity groups formed on the basis of more than one dimension of identity.
More importantly, organizing around multiple cross-cutting identity cleavages prevents the
sort of permanent ethnic majorities that form along fault lines of a single identity dimension.
It also allows members a choice between political groups that appeal to different aspects of
their identities. However, because ethnic identity is not fixed, ethnic elites still have the
ability to turn to extremism with the aim of emphasizing one dimension of ethnic identity
over others. This is where institutions come in. The key to preventing outbidding lies in the
institutional incentives provided to multidimensional ethnic groups. Chandra identifies the
institutions responsible for articulating the interests of multidimensional ethnic groups and
subsequently encouraging politicization of ethnicity. These are affirmative action policies,
legitimization of multiple languages, and federalist electoral design. All of this takes place
within a large, patronage-based democracy that has the capacity to award multiple identity
groups with positions of influence in government.
In my research, I take the position that placing collective choice theory in the category
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of primordialism is incorrect. Democracy in a plural society 2 confronts a special challenge,
according to Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), precisely because a plural society is, by definition,
a society in which prior historical context developed deep, ethnic identity-based cleavages,
and not because ethnic identity is assumed to be a rigidly fixed social trait. Furthermore,
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argue that ethnic outbidding occurs as a function of both political institutions and political entrepreneurs that play up ethnicity as a tool of mobilization,
not because ethnic associations are inherently cohesive or exclusive.
Along with this definitional concern, there are a few other problems with Chandra’s
extension of the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model. In order to make the assumption that
individuals can choose to belong to different groups based on more than one dimension of
identity presupposes that a society is already organized around multiple, cross-cutting social
cleavages. This may be true for India, where cross-cutting social cleavages are abundant, but
India’s demographic characteristics make it a unique case. In a plural society, on the other
hand, all aspects of social life exist within the (unidimensional) ethnic group. Most new
democracies look more like the plural societies examined by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972),
that is, organized along one primary dimension of ethnic identity. In multicultural, pluralist
societies there is little reason to find solutions to the problem of ethnic outbidding as is unlikely the social dynamics would produce this type of conflict to begin with. Essentially, any
theory that attempts to provide institutional solutions to the problem of ethnic outbidding
must produce solutions that fit a context of significant ethnic polarization.
Chandra (2005)’s extension of the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model of outbidding is,
nevertheless, instructive. My theoretical extension to the model takes a different direction.
Instead of arguing, like Chandra, that institutionalizing additional cross-cutting cleavages
solves the problem of outbidding, I posit that institutions designed to facilitate interethnic
cooperation at the party level are more effective in reducing ethnic outbidding and resulting
2

As opposed to a pluralistic society, which Rabushka and Shepsle define as one in which ethnic group
cleavages do not create tensions as members of the groups share multiple affiliations and market transactions
with members of other groups.
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conflict. This aggregation of multiple ethnic group interests can be achieved through constitutional bans on exclusively ethnic parties. By enforcing spatial distribution requirements,
parties must work to gain a certain threshold of supporters from each region of the country
where distinct ethnic groups reside. Political elites must, then, expand party platforms to
include concessions for multiple ethnic groups that must be attracted in order to form a winning coalition. These requirements begin a process of party competition over the support
of multiple ethnic groups. To become competitive, parties need to show that they can offer
more to ethnic minority groups than other parties can.
Ethnic party bans with spatial distribution requirements reduce ethnic conflict by affecting the incentives of both political elites and ethnic group members. First, bans eliminate
the incentive for ethnic outbidding among political elites. In order to obtain positions of
power, ethnic party elites can no longer shape platforms with promises of gains exclusively to
their own ethnic group. Instead, elites must compete to be the most inclusive, leading to the
formation of parties focused on the national over communal interest. This focus effectively
eliminates the zero sum game between ethnic groups, rewarding elite centrism over extremism. Constitutional banning also allows ethnic group members a choice between parties, but
rather than having to prioritize aspects of identity (e.g. class status over religious affiliation),
as the Chandra model suggests, individuals have more than one multiethnic party to choose
from. Interests specific to minority ethnic groups are not superseded by interests of the
larger ethnic group for when they are, members can make the choice to join another, more
appealing multiethnic party. Requiring a diverse party membership also solves the problem
created by permanent ethnic majorities. Furthermore, parties that cannot or will not alter
their message to attract a diverse base will fail. When parties fail, other parties that can
diversify will replace them.
I present the expected outcomes based on how the stated mechanisms will operate for
ethnic groups that form ethnic parties and groups that are banned from ethnic party activity, as compared to ethnic groups that neither form parties nor have been banned from
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such activity. I also discuss the potential influence of mediating democratic institutions on
propensity toward unrest.

1.2

Research Design

The analysis I put forth in this dissertation will add to the literature on ethnic political
parties and conflict by bridging the gap between effects of ethnic parties and effects of ethnic
party bans on conflict. The empirical strategy I use will also ensure that results are not a
product of improper measurement of conflict data. Furthermore, the issue of causal direction
between ethnic parties or party bans and conflict presents appreciable difficulties, noted in
both Ishiyama (2009) and Basedau and Moroff (2011), which I will address by employing
causal inference methods.
I begin by replicating the statistical models from Ishiyama (2009), conducting time series
cross sectional analysis to determine the probability of each level of protest and conflict
for each ethnic group in the sample per country-year. The original results illustrated a
significant, independent relationship between the presence of an ethnic party (the focal IV)
and increased levels of both protest intensity and conflict intensity.
Results of Ishiyama’s (2009) study are contradictory when the level of measurement of
the dependent variable is treated as ordinal versus continuous. This may have to do with
erroneous assignment of level of measurement to either of the two MAR dependent variables
for violent conflict and protest intensity (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). The solution I
propose is to employ Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling modeling to minimize the
limitations of working with qualitative data. The ALSOS method can improve upon the
issue of level of measurement selection. By extracting information from the model and using
the information to assign appropriate, non arbitrary numerical values to categories of the
dependent variable we can circumvent the problem of choosing inaccurate models that poorly
fit the data. The extraction process works iteratively between both sides of the regression
equation and results in a rescaled version of the dependent variable that may be treated
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henceforth as continuous (Young, Leeuw and Takane, 1976). That is, the precise level of
measurement is drawn from the model estimation. Not only does this technique provide a
valid measure of distance between categories but by doing so it also allows vast improvement
in interpretation and graphical presentation within an OLS framework.
Finally, to cover any problems caused by issues of endogeneity, I calculate multinomial
propensity scores with the ‘Toolkit for Weighting and Analysis of Nonequivalent Groups’ or
twang package in R (McCaffrey et al., 2013). Unlike methods of propensity score estimation
using simple logistic regression models with iterative variable section, twang employs machine
learning methods in the aim of reducing bias and mean-squared error (Lee, Lessler and
Stuart, 2010). Specifically, scores identifying the average treatment effect on the population
are generated using a Generalized Boosted Model (GBM), which is an ‘’iterative process with
multiple regression trees to capture complex and nonlinear relationships between treatment
assignment and the pretreatment covariates without over-fitting the data” (McCaffrey et al.,
2013).

1.3

Definitions, Delimitation, and Scope

I adhere to the core model assumptions of social choice theory by modeling the aggregation of
individual preferences of ethnic group members to determine collective outcomes. Following
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), I argue that ethnic party formation is particularly problematic
within plural societies, or societies with preexisting ethnic cleavages. I do not assume that
ethnic groups are naturally predisposed to conflict with other ethnic groups. Instead I suggest
that politicizing ethnicity creates problems in contexts where ethnic cleavages are so deep
they block social and economic transactions between groups.
I adopt a definition of ethnic identity consistent with the standard in the field “refers to
nominal membership in an ascriptive category, including race, language caste, or religion”
(Chandra, 2005, 236). My view on the concept of ethnic identity is compatible with the
constructivist notion that ethnic identity is not fixed or ultimately unidimensional, but rather
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that ethnicity can be fluid and, to a certain degree, self-constructed. However, since ethnic
divisions are so often institutionalized, even more so in decolonized states with a greater
probability of encountering ethnic parties and opting to restrict parties with constitutional
bans, I assume institutions can severely constrain the fluidity of ethnic identity.
One clear definitional distinction between my research on ethnic party bans and that of
Basedau and Moroff (2011) is that I am interested in what can be considered “soft” bans,
that is, constitutional bans on exclusively ethnic party competition. Basedau and Moroff, on
the other hand, focus on hard implemented party bans, or instances where an ethnic group
attempted to register as a party and was denied.
My interest in investigating soft constitutional bans, as opposed to hard, enforced bans,
is to determine whether this type of institution, distributed evenly across all ethnic groups
within a country, could have a quantifiable impact on precluding conflict. Hard bans are
problematic. There is little question that some regimes utilize strict party ban as part of a
broader “menu of manipulation” (Basedau and Moroff, 2011; Schedler, 2002)to disenfranchise
certain ethnic groups. Because of this, I suspect that few researchers would be willing to
advocate for implementing “hard” bans, even as a measure to prevent ethnic conflict. On
the contrary, constitutional bans on ethnic party participation are not necessarily repressive
institutions, but may instead serve as low cost, efficient tools to facilitate interethnic cooperation. In fact, constitutional bans are arguably less difficult to establish and more stable
than other institutional solutions to divided societies.
My large-N cross national sample expands the geographic scope limited to one country
or one region as per the norm in prior studies on ethnic bans and conflict. Broadening the
focus of study, I hope to make findings more generalizable. By doing so I also acknowledge
the trade-off between breadth versus depth of case study analysis. I intend to remedy this
issue, to an extent, by discussing confirming and disconfirming cases of ethnic group conflict
behavior under conditions of party formation and party bans.
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Significance
The practical contribution I hope to make through this research is to provide evidence on
whether or not constitutional ethnic party bans work to prevent conflict that can inform
policy. Other questions I aim to answer have implications beyond policy recommendation.
Another contribution is provided through bringing back and extending a theory that has
real explanatory power yet has been mainly avoided in current political research dealing
with identity, due to the tendency of relying on an outdated (primordial) conception of
ethnicity. I also tackle and offer solutions for problems of measurement validity which have
created a significant degree of confusion over results in the field of conflict research.
Finally, my conclusion offers some discussion dealing with the normative issue of whether
representation, as an inextricable feature of democracy, can have limitations and if these limitations are warranted in the effort to achieve democratic stability. Opponents of ethnic party
bans caution that by banning ethnic groups from political activity representing the group’s
exclusive interests governments suppress those interests and it turn, the group’s political
efficacy. Ethnic minority groups in particular already face disproportionate challenges to
political efficacy. Without the opportunity to gain representation or resolve issues specific to
the ethnic group through institutional channels ethnic groups encounter disenfranchisement
not unlike the experience of colonial rule. If constitutional bans turn out to be an effective
method of dampening unrest and stabilizing democracy, do bans diminished the quality of
the democracy they are meant to protect?
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Chapter 2

Literature Review
2.1

Ethnic Parties and Conflict

Ethnic parties are theorized to have contradictory effects on levels of civil unrest among
ethnic groups. On the one hand, formation of parties may provide representation to previously marginalized ethnic minority groups. Resolving grievances and advancing ethnic group
interests through proper institutional channels should arguably reduce any violence or nonviolent conflict. Of course, one caveat to this theory is that ethnic party representation must
be effective at achieving these goals, in other words, the party‘s role in governance must be
more than merely symbolic(Birnir, 2007a). Institutional structure of the government would
then play a large role in whether or not ethnic parties can have any influence on the plight
of the ethnic group (Birnir, 2007a; Lijphart, 1969; Beissinger, 2008; Chandra, 2004, 2005;
Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Posner, 2005).
On the other hand, ethnic parties are thought to create, or at least serve as a pathway
toward, enhanced conflict. Particularist parties that exclude all but members of the ethnic
group are considered to be dangerous by many, especially in countries with histories of
violence between ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1985). Gunther and Diamond (2001, 41) warn of
the polarizing political appeals made by ethnic parties that make “its overall contribution to
society divisive and even disintegrative”. Furthermore, politics along ethnic lines is considered
by some as a hindrance to democracy more generally (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Horowitz,
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1985; Dahl, 1998; Almond and Coleman, 1960).
In order to understand the way ethnic parties stoke conflict it is necessary to look to
both the mass and elite levels of ethnic group membership. Ethnic groups in deeply divided
societies are often involved in antagonistic relations prior to democratization. For the most
part, scholars attribute the contention to historical, institutional arrangements designed
by colonizers to pit groups against one another. Yet, when countries rapidly democratize,
as was the case during the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991; Jaggers and
Gurr, 1995), political organization occurs along the fault lines of ethnic division. Under
majoritarian, winner-take-all, electoral systems, a particularly hazardous situation unfolds
as the largest ethnic group stands to gain while all other groups end up in a losing position,
and more importantly, are likely to stay in the losing position permanently. When ethnic
parties are formed the organization leadership must actively publicize the party’s platform
and identify clear problems faced by the ethnic community that would motivate the group
to support the party (Reilly, 2006). Highlighting ethnic-based grievances, while good for
the party, has adverse effects on the ethnic group in that this can produce larger cleavages
between the group and other ethnic groups within the country.
Though, in many instances, the transition toward democracy begins with some measure to facilitate multiethnic coalition building, or power-sharing institutions, to manage
intergroup strife (Lijphart, 1999). Ethnic group leadership must then attempt to cooperate
and develop some mutual understanding with other group leaders in the name of peaceful
relations moving forward. But cooperation between groups is argued to be challenging or
even unsustainable as the shift toward moderation can lead to intragroup conflict. In plural
societies, cooperation with another ethnic group can be considered by some group members
as a betrayal. Minority ethnic groups have the most to lose through multiethnic cooperation
as there is no guarantee their interests will be a priority when countered with the interests
of larger ethnic groups. In the context of intragroup tensions new political entrepreneurs
capitalize on the opportunity to occupy leadership roles by playing up intergroup cleavages.
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These entrepreneurs engage in competition with moderate ethnic elite over the support of
ethnic group members and attempt to outbid their moderate counterparts with promises
of gains exclusive to the ethnic group, portraying elites that negotiate as sell-outs. One of
the major consequences of ethnic outbidding is the adoption of extreme strategies in order
to boost support from members hostile to competing ethnic groups (Rabushka and Shepsle,
1972).
It may also be the case that the formation of an ethnic party indicates that grievance
already exists along ethnic lines, therefore causing ethnic groups with parties to have a
greater propensity toward unrest than groups without parties(Horowitz, 1985). If so, the
establishment of an ethnic party could act as a red flag of escalating conflict potential of the
ethnic group (Ishiyama, 2009).
Lastly, parties also provide ethnic groups with the organizational resources necessary
for mobilization of ethnic group members. The capacity for mobilization is a necessary
prerequisite in the move toward protest or violent conflict. This, less thoroughly explored,
explanation for ethnic party formation identifies parties as a source of ethnic mobilization,
though not intended to secure government positions. While most of the literature on ethnic
party formation centers on the birth of particularist parties in new democracies, there are
many ethnic parties that formed before decolonization that had little to no potential for
formal inclusion in institutional politics yet assembled to mobilize ethnic masses for the
purpose of resistance. Randall (2008) describes this situation occurring in Afghanistan from
the 1940s, however clandestinely. During the Afghan civil war in the 1980s many of these
ethnic parties “functioned for all practical purposes as armed factions rather than parties”.
While case studies on the topic of ethnic parties abound, up until recently, there had
not been systematic cross-national evaluation of the relationship between ethnic parties
and conflict. The problems of external validity inherent in research based on a single case
is acknowledged by comparativists. Chandra (2005, 238) in particular, in reference to the
limitations of her study of ethnic parties in India, explains that the reason we cannot examine
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ethnic party conflict processes more generally is because “[w]e lack the cross-national data
on the positions taken by ethnic parties that would allow a systematic empirical test of
the outbidding models”. Though, since her 2005 study, advancements in data collection on
characteristics of minority ethnic groups, from the Minorities at Risk Database, can at least
allow systematic inquiry into conflict potential of these groups.
Ishiyama’s (2009) large-N quantitative study uses MAR data to predict violent and nonviolent conflict between ethnic groups with ethnic parties and those not affiliated with ethnic
parties and is the first empirical inquiry on the subject. For the analysis, Ishiyama (2009)
runs time series cross-sectional ordinal logit models including lagged endogenous dependent
variables, with a series of group-level and country-level controls. Results reveal a significant
positive relationship between the presence of an ethnic party and increasing levels of both
violent and nonviolent conflict. Out of concern that the presence of an ethnic party may
not be causing conflict but could instead be a product of conflict leads Ishiyama to further
scrutinize the relationship by comparing difference of means of both protest and violence
levels before and after the appearance of an ethnic party. Results of the t-tests show ethnic
party formation increases levels of protest behavior, on average, but comparable violence
levels. Ishiyama (2009) reports that results are mixed, but leans toward the conclusion that
parties do not definitively produce greater levels of violence, despite the findings in the full
model.

2.2

Institutional Facilitation of Ethnic Parties

Opponents of the argument that ethnic parties create more conflict claim that outbidding
is not necessarily the natural outgrowth of ethnic party formation (Birnir, 2008). In fact,
some go as far as to argue that particularist parties might be a necessary requisite, or
at least not always harmful, to new democracies (Birnir, 2007a; Chandra, 2004; Ishiyama,
2009; Lijphart, 1977). Instead, when properly incentivized, moderation and cooperation
between multiple ethnic parties can be coerced by effective institutional design. Bogaards
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(2008) reviews the slate of party regulations available through constitutional engineering
and develops a typology based on three distinct functions these regulations are intended
to perform: aggregation of social cleavages, articulation of social cleavages into political
cleavages, and blocking politicization of social cleavages.
Articulation of social cleavages into political cleavages can be achieved through some
form of consociational or consensus democracy, where ethnic groups are in charge of governing
their own interests and sometimes geographical territories in the process of power-sharing.
Bogaards (2008) cites modern examples of institutional articulation which include electoral
design that reserves seats for minority group members, offers list proportional representation,
or at the very least spells out more lax rules for registration of minority ethnic group parties.
A host of electoral system designs yield party regulations to aggregate social cleavages into
multiethnic political cleavages. Mechanisms aimed to encourage the emergence of parties
across social cleavages include alternative vote, single transferable vote, constituency pooling
(one party system), presidential elections and parliamentary elections (both with spatial
distribution requirements). The methods of blocking politicization of ethnic groups are the
extremely restrictive one-party system, which many African countries adopted between the
1960s and the 1980s, and banning ethnic parties.
2.2.1

Articulation

There is relative consensus among political scientists warning of the threat politicization of
ethnic groups in divided societies pose to democratic stability. Simple majoritarian systems,
such as first past the post (FPTP) elections, in polarized societies garner few opportunities
for representation of minority group interests (Beissinger, 2008). As the perpetual losers
of all issue matters, minority groups cannot grant political institutions legitimacy and turn
instead to extrainstitutional channels for group gains. Articulation of social cleavages into
politically distinct units is the first solution offered by scholars in defense of ethnic groups
governing their own interests in democracies developing post-decolonization.
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Lijphart (1969) offers one of the first accounts to formulate institutional strategies necessary to counter the threat of newly politicizing ethnic divisions. For democracy to work,
the political salience of ethnic identity cannot be ignored but must instead be upheld and
incorporated into an appropriate system for all groups involved. Through consociational
democracy, ethnic groups engage in governmental power-sharing which “entails conscious cooperation among elites of different communities to control the destabilizing effects of open,
ethnic competition”, or ethnic outbidding (Lijphart, 1969). This is accomplished through
elite arrangements to preclude the circulation of more extremist junior elites and to resist
mass pressures from electorate for political change. Two main characteristics of consociational government are sharing executive power through grand coalitions and segmental
authority over group territory allowing each ethnic group autonomy over their own affairs
(Lijphart, 2002). According to Norris (2002), consociational arrangements can successfully
provide ethnic group representation in a manner that diffuses conflict produced by extremism
by establishing proportional representation systems combined with parliamentary government. Throughout Lijphart’s entire body of work his advocacy for consociational solutions
to ethnic divisions is unwavering, providing numerous examples of the successes proportional
representation has had to create democratic stability in newly democratized states (Lijphart,
1999). In addition to list proportional representation, other strategies for articulating ethnic
group interests politically include quotas for minority groups in government and streamlined
registration regulations for minority parties (Bogaards, 2008).
Institutional design in India achieves articulation of ethnic group interest in a unique
way (Chandra, 2005). Chandra (2004) illustrates how institutions facilitated the moderation
of ethnic parties in India, by rewarding diversity through systems of patronage. Furthermore,
through a process of emphasizing and building on complex cross-cutting cleavages that cut
through unidimensional ethnic identity affiliations, parties were forced to broaden appeals to
capture members from other castes, regions, and religions. With benefits accruing to groups
based on various, compound aspects of identity traits, no process of ethnic outbidding based
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on one unifying ethnic identity could occur. By institutionalizing intragroup diversity, and
offering representation across the board, more inclusive Indian government lead to greater
representation of multiple moderate ethnic parties in government.
The view that institutional design, of the kind discussed by Lijphart (1969, 1999), can
resolve the outbidding dilemma created by ethnic parties is strongly criticized by Horowitz
(2007, 2014). Power-sharing, in Horowitz’s view, does not offer incentives for compromise
between groups, nor does it promote moderate behavior. Even when special arrangement
are made to facilitate multiethnic cooperation, such as those discussed by Chandra (2004,
2005), Horowitz (2007) points out that building institutional incentives to enhance moderation proves to be formidable. While members of an ethnic party may be better served by
cooperation, party leadership typically has different incentives. Reshaping those incentives
requires major institutional shifts in many cases, some of which are aimed at diminishing
power of the majority party (obviously a hard sell). In fact, if the India case is to be instructive in the development of institutional mechanisms that foster ethnic party success,
as Chandra claims, skepticism is certain to arise after acknowledging the contextual factors
presumed to be in place for the structure to function. To demonstrate, consider the core
hypothesis of Chandra’s (2004) ‘Why Ethnic Parties Succeed’:
An ethnic party is likely to succeed in a patronage-democracy when it has competitive rules for intra-party advancement and when the size of the ethnic group
it seeks to mobilize exceeds the threshold of winning or leverage imposed the
electoral system.
Requirements for achieving the ideal habitat for ethnic parties begin first with a patrondemocracy, which Chandra (2004) defines as a democracy with a larger public sector proportionate to its private sector. Beyond this major structural economic condition, the provision
of ethnic group size must be met, and then party rules may promote ethnic party success.
Further inquiry into institutional mechanisms that assuage ethnic outbidding leads Chandra
(2005) to several other government-level concessions made to ethnic parties which work to
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divvy up positions of influence and resources through affirmative action policies in the public
sector. The main caveats, however, are that her model only works in an environment with
many cross-cutting cleavages, two-party competition, and occur under a FPTP electoral
system. In other words, prescriptions do not generalize well outside the area of focus, India.
2.2.2

Aggregation

Critics of consociationalism and alternative forms of institutional design which purports to
articulate ethnic interests in the political realm argue that without some effort to aggregate
existing social cleavages these cleavages will only become more volatile and threaten democratic stability. Their prescription to mitigate risks to democracy presented by deep ethnic
divisions is to establish institutions that require ethnic group leaders to seek support outside
of the group. Various electoral systems and constitutional regulations have been engineered
to coerce multiethnic cooperation and coalition formation at the party level.
Horowitz (1991) is a strong defender of merits of constitutional design that enforces votepooling mechanisms. Vote pooling is a method of consolidating votes across ethnic group lines
which encourages ethnic group leadership to develop moderate platforms in order to attract
a plurality of voters. The most effective method of vote-pooling, according to Horowitz
(1991), is the alternative vote which is a majoritarian electoral system which requires parties
to gain an absolute majority to win. Unlike FPTP voting, which only requires a plurality and
counts only one vote choice, alternative vote allows voters to rank candidates according to
preference and in the event no candidate receives a majority second and third preferences are
considered. Alternative vote in a presidential system forces pre-election interethnic coalitionbuilding, rather than relying on voluntary post-election cooperation between ethnic groups
presumed by advocates of power-sharing arrangements. In addition to this requirement,
Horowitz also argues for presidential support from various federal districts so parties are
incentivized to reach out to as many minority ethnic groups as possible.
The problem with systems of proportional representation is that even when minority
groups secure seats in government it does not ensure their group interests will be represented.
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The majority party in parliamentary systems typically holds the reigns without requiring
input from minority members. Parliamentary coalitions would counter this problem, but
in societies with large majorities, even coalition-building may not be enough to influence
policy. For presidential systems, division of power makes a difference in deterring one group
from gaining a monopoly of power over others (Horowitz, 1985). Reilly (2002, 159) argues
that vote-pooling systems like alternative vote or single transferable vote (STV) institutes
“centripetalism”, an approach to conflict management that pulls party competition toward
moderation by providing electoral incentives for politicians to reach out to other ethnic groups
for votes, an arena of bargaining, and the potential for developing “centrist, aggregative, and
multiethnic political parties or coalitions of parties that are capable of making crossethnic
appeals”.
Federalism is a method of aggregation societal cleavages into political coalitions through
power-dividing, rather than power-sharing. Proponents of power-dividing solutions to ethnic tensions argue that power-sharing institutions are not effective in integrating societal
interests, and instead retain and consolidate divisions between groups. Roeder (2005) claims
power-sharing institutions yield three primary incentives to escalate conflict between ethnic
groups. First, all issues remain ethnic issues, so all policy matters produce a conflict that
must be settled between groups. Second, power-sharing increases the incentive for ethnic
leaders to amp up demands to please members of the ethnic group. Third, ethnic leaders
are empowered to make demands on the state that must be met or the state can suffer
losses inflicted by the group. All in all, the zero-sum game between ethnic groups that is
supposed to be a serious issue in majoritarian systems cannot be resolved by power-sharing
institutions.
Power-dividing institutions inherent in the design of federalism reduce incentives of
groups to play up ethnic matters over national ones. Roeder (2005, 55) insists that federalism offers the structural remedy for dissolving deep ethnic cleavages by empowering
“multiple majorities, each construing the public interest somewhat differently in separate,

19

independent organs of government”, providing multiethnic access for representation at the
regional level of governance.
While federalist systems have not always been successful in aggregating ethnic group
interests across cross-cutting social dimensions, as intended, Roeder (1991) explains that
its failures lie in the contextual features of states where it has been attempted, notably, in
Yugoslavia and the USSR. In these contexts, the flaw in institutional design lies in geographic
distribution of a dominant group residing in a core ethnic region, giving the group a mandate
on state affairs. Federalism cannot aid in facilitating ethnic groups that have already resolved
to split into independent states, such as the case of former Soviet states (Roeder, 1991). This
process is termed “ethnonationalism”, defined as “claims and counterclaims concerning the
right of an ethnic group to self-governance within a state of its own” (Roeder, 2005, 53).
2.2.3

Blocking

Finally, there are two institutional designs implemented to block ethnic cleavages from entering the political arena, according to Bogaards (2008): the one-party system and bans
on ethnic party formation/participation in politics. There are several methods of execution
possible for each blocking institution.
Attempts to block the politicization of ethnicity during major movements toward democracy in the 1960’s resulted in the adoption of one-party rule in most Africa states by the
1970’s (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Reilly, 2006). Among these states, there was a lot
of variation in one-party systems, most characterized by the lack of competitive elections
which were assumed to be catalysts for interethnic unrest. Though, in some states elections were used to demonstrate that the party has mandate to continue ruling, a measure
adopted to enhance legitimacy of new quasi-democratic institutions. Some states, like Kenya
for instance, only held an initial competitive election to establish which party will run the
government and afterward held highly competitive primary elections for selection of party
elites (Tordoff, 1997). One-party systems, lacking competitive transitions of power between
parties, are characterized by extreme centralization of power, clientelism, and corruption.
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I do not spend much time arguing for the viability of the one-party system in blocking the
process of ethnic outbidding. Where the electoral design worked, it merely provided a thin,
and temporary, barrier against ethnic group competition flooding newly independent African
political systems. While one-party rule was originally implemented to protect democratic
stability in divided states, history has shown that one-party rule is neither democratic nor
effectively stabilizing.
In order to achieve lasting democratic stability in ethnically divided societies without
stripping the competitiveness from elections many governments opt to strip the ethnicity
out of competitive parties instead. Most often, party bans are explicitly provided for in a
country’s constitution (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010). The function of ethnic
party bans is to forestall conflict and instability by blocking the politicization of ethnicity.
Though, Bogaards (2008) explains that, in most cases, ethnic party bans also serve an
aggregation function, depending on the way the regulation is outlined in the constitution.
The next section describes the practice of ethnic party banning and reviews advantages and
drawbacks to this method of aggregating social cleavages to produce multiethnic parties.

2.3

Ethnic Party Bans

Whether or not there proves to be heightened risks of conflict or democratic instability associated with the ethnicization of politics, the perceived potential for conflict brought about
by the formation of ethnic parties has been enough to influence policy-makers. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have placed bans on ethnic parties in the aim of circumventing
the kinds of problems these parties are thought to create. In fact, the vast majority of
new democracies world-wide have implemented some form of constitutional party regulation
(VanBiezen, 2008), many specifically relevant to the ethnic composition of party organizations (Bogaards, 2008). Though, it is reasonable to assume that implementing party bans
may have equally adverse consequences.
Advocacy for ethnic party bans derives from the threat posed by ethnic party formation
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primarily in conflict prone societies. Banning parties prior to formation is hoped to cancel
out harmful effects of party competition along ethnic lines. The process of constitutional
banning is relatively uniform across time and space. In regions where new democracies are
developing bans are often placed on all particularist party formation. Theoretically, the
idea is to force citizens to seek representation from a party that is more socially inclusive
to other groups. This way, parties will build platforms on pertinent issues appealing to
overlapping segments of civil society (Lijphart, 1977). Pay-off structures, then, change from
zero-sum contests between groups over exclusive, sometimes symbolic, goods (e.g. official
language, serving specific regions where groups inhabit) into consolidated efforts to allocate
and maintain collective social goods.
Unfortunately, the move to prevent ethnic party formation can block ethnic groups from
the positive benefits a political party can provide. Particularly, in societies with deep ethnic
cleavages, it is not always clear how parties may be organized to cut across ethnic lines.
Denying ethnic groups the opportunity to be present in institutional politics can exclude
large segments of society from the chance to be represented. Bans can create problems for
already disadvantaged minority groups, which can produce greater unrest, as has been seen
in some Latin American cases (Birnir, 2007a), as bans inflame existing grievances. According
to Birnir (2008, 164) “ethic group propensity for rebellion against the state increases over
time where electorally active ethnic groups are excluded from the executive”. On the other
hand, if parties enhance ethnic groups’ organizational ability to mobilize in protest or violent
conflict placing bans on party formation may prevent these situations from occurring. Doing
so can be understood as both beneficial for the state and repressive for the groups themselves.
Finally, in some extreme cases, bans have been applied in new democracies as a measure to
preclude larger, majority ethnic groups from taking power held by a minority party prior
to democratic transition (Schedler, 2002). Whether or not bans are used as a pretext to
disenfranchise opposition groups, Randall (2008) notes that there is still the potential for
ethnic party bans to “reduce the legitimacy of the system and hence become subject to
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conflict themselves”.
Basedau and Moroff (2011) investigate the results of ethnic party bans through a series of
exploratory endeavors, assessing the activities of several banned ethnic parties in SubSaharan
Africa before and after bans were placed. They posit three possible outcomes. First, banning
ethnic parties could accomplish exactly what the government intends, that is, the reduction
of conflict. The second possibility is that banning ethnic groups from forming parties could
create more conflict by creating greater grievance among the group disallowed from political
representation. Finally, the authors suggest that a ban may not impact conflict activity at
all.
The researchers employ a four step design beginning with a large N approach comparing
average level of conflict prevalence between countries with bans and countries without bans
using bivariate analysis to analyze effects of bans on six types of conflict process, finding no
substantial correlation (positive or negative). In the next step Basedau and Moroff (2011)
select a small sample of countries that share conflict-producing traits, but differ with respect
to implementation of bans, using most-similar-systems design, once again, finding no significant differences between countries. Authors then examine whether conflict levels change
after the implementation of a party ban, also at the country-year level of analysis, showing
no change in violent conflict for 28 of 32 countries. Finally, Basedau and Moroff (2011) turn
to in-depth case studies of 12 ethnic groups in six countries facing major bans. The majority
of groups experienced no change in conflict one-year after the ban was implemented, while
three groups in Burundi and Rwanda engaged in less conflict and one in Uganda produced
greater conflict levels.
The Basedau and Moroff (2011) study is the first of its kind to systematically probe
the influence of ethnic party bans on conflict. While important and groundbreaking, there
are some drawbacks to the research design that leave questions as to how robust the results
may be. First, the authors press for the examination of “actually implemented” party bans
denying certain groups the ability to form parties and how this impacts ethnic group conflict,
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but the quantitative analysis looks at conflict at the country, not the ethnic group, level.
Second, it is unclear why the authors choose bivariate correlations for their large N study,
without controlling for any group or country-level conditions. The case studies provide a
more nuanced depiction of ethnic group-level conflict activity, but only look at groups with
bans to see whether the ban reduced conflict just one year after its implementation. Finally,
the most glaring concern arises from the interpretation of results. Basedau and Moroff (2011)
conclude that there is little evidence suggesting that ethnic bans have any impact on violent
conflict. However, because ethnic party bans, in almost all cases, deny registration to an
ethnic group before it is active (rather than dissolve an active ethnic party) it is unclear
why a ban would result in decreased conflict, but instead should keep political entrepreneurs
from ethnic outbidding via party activity. This means that ethnic bans are doing exactly
what they are intended to do, which is to prevent heightened conflict.
Overall, the fact that increased tensions follow from the establishment of ethnic parties
in newly competitive democracies is uncontroversial. Even those who support ethnic party
involvement in government recommend careful institutional engineering to facilitate their
entry.
Advocates of consociationalism promote institutions that articulate ethnic group cleavages into politics, though power-sharing requires a great deal of faith in ethnic group leaders
to maintain relations that are not properly incentivized. Contenders of aggregation methods
have found that institutional engineering intended to diversify government representation
or encourage multiethnic political parties provides the incentives necessary for interethnic
coalition-building. This line of argument implies that for ethnic parties to work, not only
do the electoral rules need revision, but ethnic parties themselves must become a little less
exclusively ethnic.
While constitutional bans of exclusively ethnic political parties are categorized as a
method of blocking the politicization of ethnic identity, they can also be understood as
useful tools of aggregating communal interests at the party level. Constitutional ethnic
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party bans may block particularist politics, but this is not the equivalent of erasing ethnic
group interests from the political arena. Prohibiting the exclusionary aspect of ethnic parties
encourages parties to organize along other lines, seeking support from several identity groups,
using other cleavages as the source of support (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010). In
fact, Bogaards (2008) points out that the constitutional banning of ethnic parties, while on
its face appears to serve a blocking function, is usually accompanied by specific guidelines
for developing an appropriately inclusive multiethnic organization. For example, Bogaards
(2008, 58) identifies:
“In Africa, 22 countries combine a ban on ethnic parties (blocking) with the requirement of national presence (aggregation). Many of these countries go on to
specify spatial distribution requirements for party registration. These requirements pertain to party organization, party membership or both”
I argue that bans may be even better aggregation tools than other institutional designs
with the same purpose for several reasons. Spelling out prohibitive policies in a national
constitution is far less costly than overhauling an electoral system in favor of one that may
or may not properly attend to ethnic cleavages. After all, party law has become a common
feature in modern constitutional design (VanBiezen, 2008), and reforming constitutions in
transitioning democracies is even more common. Another advantage to regulating parties is
that regulations can offer the best features of power-sharing and power-dividing strategies to
accomplish coalition building at the party level. Consociationalism requires political elite to
control the spiraling of extremist outbidding and compromise with other group leaders at the
national level. Bans on exclusively ethnic parties can accomplish the same at the party level.
Federalism requires the division of power often accompanied by spatial regulations to include
minority groups. Party bans also feature this type of requirement. Yet, when power-sharing
and power-dividing deals break down the integrity of the entire system is threatened. But
when these strategies break down at the party level, only the party fails, requiring leaders
to reestablish another multiethnic coalition or risk dying out.
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Chapter 3

Theory
Broken down to its simplest form, there are three conditions or states of the world with respect to ethnic groups and their political representation and similarly, three different states
of the world regarding ethnic-based conflict. Ethnic group elites either possess the motivation and resources to establish an ethnic political party or they do not. Those willing
and able either find themselves constitutionally permitted to form and register their ethnic
party for electoral competition or will be constitutionally barred from ethnic party activity, in which case these political entrepreneurs can direct their political ambitions toward
forming multiethnic political parties. Three possible outcomes that follow from these political arrangements are violent unrest, peaceful protest, or the absence of conflict altogether.
The theory that follows attempts to explain which condition I expect to produce to which
outcome, and whether these relationships hold up under various circumstances.
At the heart of the theory advanced below is essentially a revisitation of Rabushka and
Shepsle’s original theory of collective choice in a plural society, founded on assumptions of
social choice theory. After a discussion of the social choice theory underpinnings of my
theoretical perspective I identify the dilemma involved with sharing the spoils of political
outcomes within ethnically divided, plural societies and discuss a number of factors that
can potentially lead ethnic groups into conflict. Next, I discuss how the model assumptions
work and follow by detailing the process of ethnic outbidding at the elite and mass levels,
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identifying key model mechanisms involved in predicting group outcomes: legitimacy and
preference intensity.
I address the proposed solutions to ethnic outbidding previously highlighted in the review
of literature, assessing the way each institutional adjustment theoretically works to curb
ethic elite motivations to move toward group-exclusive agendas and extremism. I build
on an extension to the ethnic outbidding model to explore behavioral expectations of ethnic
group members constrained by the institution of constitutional bans on ethnic party electoral
competition and how these outcomes may change as new democratic institutions become
more entrenched.

3.1

Social Choice Theory

Social choice theory is a model of human behavior rooted in individual preferences, choices
of action to take based on these preferences, institutional structures that constrain and aggregate individual choice and actions, and the payoffs or outcomes that follow from action.
Individuals are assumed to have unique, well-defined preferences formed on the basis of taste.
For a preference to be “well-defined” it must engender two main properties: 1) connectivity: it is possible to choose alternatives as they are distinct and sufficiently comparable;
and 2)transitivity: it is possible to rank preferences in a consistent manner, that is, if one
preferred A over B and B over C, it is not possible to prefer C over A. Satisfying these
two conditions allows us to model preferences of individuals as being ordered. In this case,
if individual preferences can be considered ordered along a particular continuum, then an
individual can be considered to make rational choices and their preferred outcomes may be
assigned a weighed utility function.
An individual can have a plethora of preferences concerning cultural, economic, and
governmental matters. In open economic markets, individuals simply make their own choices
and demand shapes supply of outcomes. When it comes to governmental decisions, however,
individuals are not able to each go their own way as options provided by the public sector
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are far more limited and designed to satisfy groups rather than individuals. Somehow,
provision of social goods through policy implemented by the government must be decided
on which inevitably produces conflict. To avoid conflict, individual preferences, then, must
be aggregated in some way to delimit a menu of policy options for individuals to select from.
This aggregation of individual preferences occurs through institutional mechanisms which
funnel them into a cohesive, collective choice. Collective choice procedures, like majority
rule for instance, help to ensure preference conflicts between individuals can be resolved.
Simple majority rule is not a perfect system, of course. When multiple choices are available
it is easily the case that no individual’s first choice is chosen from the majority, but then
the most preferred option compared to all others, or the majority alternative, is chosen.
The situation in which no majority exists is also a possible outcome and must be dealt
with using alternative voting strategies. Though, the main focus of Rabushka and Shepsle
(1972) is not the problem of cycling majorities or the failure to determine the majority
alternative. Instead, the theory of collective choice in plural societies suggests that in this
context neither majority rule nor majority alternatives can resolve social conflict in a manner
that is acceptable to all social groups, particularly members of a permanent minority.

3.2

Plural Societies

Rabushka and Shepsle establish that, in terms of political preferences, there is a distinct
difference between what they describe as a plural society and a pluralistic society. Plural
societies are those within which a primary social cleavage runs deep, splitting communities
along a single, social dimension of ethnicity,

1

while pluralistic societies are characterized by

a multitude of overlapping, cross-cutting cleavages along a variety of social dimensions which
often create shared values between ethnic groups along other lines. In pluralistic societies,
ethnicity does not outstrip all cultural or social memberships which weave through ethnic
group lines, nor does it prevent the flows of integrated economic activity between groups.
In other words, ethnicity can be a fluid, secondary, or innocuous social construct that does
1

defined by tribe, race, language, religion, etc.

28

not engender hatred between social groups. Conversely, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, 20)
insist that “the hallmark of the plural society, and the feature that distinguishes it from its
pluralistic counterpart, is the practice of politics almost exclusively along ethnic lines”.
Unfortunately, producing policy within a plural society proves to be far more challenging,
at least when it comes to producing outcomes for the whole, as preferences for exclusive
communal gains outweigh preferences for national gains. At a glance, it would seem that the
opposite would be true. Intuitively, if social and political relations flatten to one dimension
of ethnicity it should be easier for individuals to come to an agreement on a single policy.
However, according to classic democratic theory, a necessary prerequisite for democracy to
function properly, and thus be stable, is a populous with a diverse range of preferences. While
satisfying a multitude of different, often incompatible preferences is no simple task, what this
does is guarantee that coalitions develop on an issue by issue basis. In a pluralistic society,
where individuals are integrated with one another through commerce, within educational
institutions, at workplaces, places of worship, etc, individuals that are members of different
ethnic groups may be on the same side of an issue dealing with cultural practices, but the
same individuals may be opponents on an issue of education, or economic matters. It also
means that there is a low probability that any one individual will find themselves on the
losing side of every policy decision. So, even if an individual’s preferences are not directly
represented in a particular policy, their stake in the social good (be it funds allocated to
schools, parks, or national defense) is secure.
In plural societies, where all social issues boil down to a single ethnic dimension, ethnic
identity determines which side an individual takes on all issues. Policy matters revolve around
gains or losses for the ethnic group. In this state, there are no longer social goods that can be
shared by all. What happens is that social goods are seen as gains for one ethnic community
and at the same time losses for another or others. For example, a new school built in an
area inhabited by one ethnic community is also a blow to a competing ethnic community.
To make matters worse, when ethnicity determines which side an individual is on all policy
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matters, and the ethnic group is a minority, the individual is always on the losing side of
policy decisions. Antagonisms like these do not make for a sustainable democratic situation,
according to Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) as the arrangement can have a significant impact
on the legitimacy of democratic institutions. This concept of legitimacy is another essential
dimension of institutions indirectly associated with institutional effectiveness in matching
collective preferences with outcomes. Legitimacy, defined as the “capacity of the system
to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most
appropriate ones for society” (Lipset, 1959, 61) plays a major role in determining outcomes
and expectations (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).

3.3

Ethnic Group Preferences

The last step involved in modeling expectations of ethnic group behavior is to lay out the
necessary assumptions required to translate individual preferences into group action. The
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model requires some strong assumptions, some of which will
require my forthcoming defense. The first assumption states that individual preferences
within an ethnic community (in a plural society) are uniform and can all be represented
by a common preference function. This assumption is the most important, as the authors
model an individual preference (as groups cannot have preferences in rational choice models), as representative of the ethnic group. Second, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) assume
ethnic groups in plural societies engage in intercommunal conflict which refers to discord
between ethnic communities on all issues that face the society. Third, individual ethnic
group members experience a perceptual consensus on a set of available alternatives. These
rather restrictive conditions set the stage for the formal modeling of ethnic group behavior
and form the backbone of the ethnic outbidding model.
In sum, when the most salient dimension of preference is always ethnic

2

loyalty of

group members is communal rather than national. According to the assumptions of model,
2

Again, I must stress that there is nothing about the dimension being specifically ethnic that makes
salience more intense.
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ethnic group member preferences are based on gains to the ethnic group and losses to a
(or many) competing ethnic groups(s). The implications of unified, nonnegotiable, intensely
held preferences of ethnic group members is the development of a “go for broke” attitude,
or the position that the ethnic group members are willing to accept great costs to achieve
group goals and take away from rival groups. Now, this fact alone is perhaps a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for conflict, either violent or nonviolent. The conflict arises when
ethnic groups in divided societies become politicized.

3.4

Ethnic Outbidding

Politicizing ethnicity is the task of the ethnic political elite. Within plural societies, the stage
is already set for competition between ethnic groups. When deeply divided societies make
the transition toward democracy, political entrepreneurs within each ethnic group compete
for leadership roles. During the process of elite competition, leaders bid for the support
of members of the ethnic group. Some leaders may begin with more moderate positions
that make concessions to other ethnic groups in the aim of facilitating greater national
cooperation. However, in a plural society, where preferences of the ethnic group are uniform
and intensely held, and gains to other groups are considered as losses to the ethnic group,
this is not a winning strategy. More moderate ethnic group leaders are then outbid by
other political entrepreneurs who promise larger gains exclusive to the ethnic group. These
leaders can even stir up greater animosity between ethnic groups to win stronger support
from within their own ethnic group.
For majority ethnic groups, an outbidding strategy can lead to electoral success at
the expense of the country’s ethnic minority groups. Though, success at the polls does
not necessarily come without its residual consequences, even for majority ethnic groups.
Outbidding includes extremism and othering of outgroup members that reinforce the zero
sum game between groups even when the majority group controls the state. For minority
ethnic groups, especially those in countries that have a large ethnic group comprising over
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50% of the country’s population, ethnic elite outbidding can lead further down the road to
violent extremism as groups with intense preferences find themselves excluded permanently
from holding legitimate positions of political power.
A particular dilemma involved with outbidding is the tendency for the process to spiral
outward. When one ethnic group becomes politicized and moves toward extremism other
ethnic groups follow in a surge of outbidding. Prior ethnic cleavages deepen and become
galvanized. Eventually compromise between groups is no longer attainable.

3.5

Legitimacy

Eroding the legitimacy of government institutions can have a detrimental impact on the
survival of the state and may even lead to violent unrest. Consider the social choice mechanism of majority rule. When a pluralistic society determines collective choice outcomes
through majority rule, the majority wins their preferred policy outcome and the minority
loses. One might think that the minority would have a problem with this and fail to accept
the outcome. However, because individuals in a pluralistic society have diverse preferences
over a range of issues it should work out that an individual may be in the minority on a
certain policy issue today and be a member of the majority on another policy choice the
next day. Individuals can rest assured that government institutions fairly allocate goods and
adopt a “you win some, you lose some” attitude. On the other hand, in plural societies “when
individuals have incompatible preferences and expect these incompatibilities to persist over
a number of important issues, then it is not likely that a consistent ‘loser’ will grant the
political institutions legitimacy” (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, 52).
Lack of trust in institutions to produce equitable outcomes can lead individuals to seek
desired outcomes in extrainstitutional ways. Frustration with consistent losses can set the
stage for unrest. Protest is thought to occur when attempts to make progress through the
usual institutional pathways fails. However, the act of protest suggests that individuals
involved assign at least some legitimacy to institutions and identify protest as a useful tactic
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to make change through means that keep those institutions in tact. On the other hand,
when institutional legitimacy fizzles out completely, there is little to be gained from peaceful
protest 3 .

3.6

Preference Intensity

Another issue that affects outcomes, according to Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), is preference
intensity. Individuals make choices based on preferences. When it comes to making collective
choices, as detailed above, individual choices are limited and aggregated through institutional
mechanisms. Yet, procedures of simple majority rule, and the like, adopt decisions based
on a preference count, assuming all preferences have equal weight. But there are significant
behavioral implications involved with incompatibilities in affect concerning preference. A
classic example of the dilemma of preference intensity is the case of an apathetic majority
selecting a winning policy against a passionate minority.
More intense preferences are problematic in a few ways. First off, high intensity preferences against a policy chosen by the majority makes accepting the outcomes produced by
majority rule challenging. Coupled with the low legitimacy awarded to institutions under
which an individual is always losing, high preference intensity for the losing outcome can lead
to conflict. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) also describe how preference intensity influences
individual calculations of acceptable cost bearing or how far an individual is willing to go
to obtain their preferred outcome. The more intensely a preference is felt the more likely it
is that individuals will subscribe to extremist pleas against competing groups, and the less
likely it is that a compromise over social goods can be found. Finally, intense preferences
are nonnegotiable, so much so that attempts to deescalate intergroup conflict can be seen as
a betrayal to the group. It is this intensity of preference for gains to the ethnic group solely
that is fueled by, and reciprocally fuels, ethnic outbidding.
3

There are exceptions. When Egyptians protested the Mubarak regime in 2011 the goal was to oust
the brutal regime. Though, protestors found the regime to be illegitimate, not the institutions per se.
Furthermore, once the regime was ousted and Islamists gained control of the government repression continued
and violence ensued.
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3.7

Nature of Ethnic Identity

While most scholars of ethnic party behavior credit Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) as seminal
to the literature, the model is often criticized for its supposed primordialist assumptions
which overemphasize the static nature of ethnic allegiances. I assert that the critique of
Rabushka and Shepsle somewhat oversimplifies their argument painting their portrayal of
ethnicity as more deterministic than it actually is. The argument laid out in Plural Societies
(1972) does not rely on the supposition that ethnic salience is inherent or immutable, as
primordialists contend. Primordial sentiments, where they exist, are instead a product of
historical circumstance and appeals from political elites of the ethnic group and the rhetoric
of the exclusionary ethnic political party.
Chandra (2005) takes issue with a main assumption of the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972)
model which she claims stresses the deterministic nature of ethnic affiliation and antagonisms between ethnic groups. In her research, Chandra (2005) argues that the pessimistic
attitude regarding the inherent dangers of ethnic party formation is unwarranted. She counters with the assertion that choice of group membership exists on more than one dimension
of identity. Basically, Chandra’s model begins with the same rational choice assumptions as
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). The innovation lies in her relaxing the assumption that ethnic
affiliations produce irreconcilable boundaries between groups. Though Chandra (2005, 245)
does not deny the existence of ethnic outbidding, she attributes the process to the institutional setting that imposes “artificial fixity on ethnic identities”. She claims that when ethnic
parties, fragmented along multiple lines of identity, are encouraged and properly incorporated into government the process of outbidding toward outer extremes circles back to the
center, resulting in a centrist equilibrium. Chandra (2005, 240) concludes with a prescription for fostering, rather than limiting, ethnic identity politics, stating that a “multitude of
freely forming ethnic majorities may be a more effective safeguard against destabilization of
democracy than the imposition of constraints on any single one”.
The extension of the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model that I present below shows that
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the imposition of constraints on ethnic parties can be an effective safeguard against conflict
as well. Furthermore, limiting the politicization of ethnicity can work in plural societies that
are already deeply divided along a common faultline of ethnic identity. Like Chandra, I also
assume that ethnic identity is not fixed or immutable, however, I argue that when ethnic
rivalries, built under divisive colonial institutions, persist for long periods of time they are
not as fluid as Chandra suggests, especially when ethnic identity corresponds to ascriptive,
physiological traits. Chandra demonstrates the value of her model with a single descriptive
case, India, which is uniquely suited for positive predictions, with cross-cutting cleavages of
caste, class, religion, etc. In plural societies, without much integration between ethnic groups
along sociocultural or economic lines, a different solution is required. I assume that ethnic
identity, like institutions, can be “sticky”, in the sense that even if it is in an individual’s
best interest to collaborate with members of another ethnic group in order to form a winning
coalition, loyalty to ethnic group interests may prevent the individual from performing this
seemingly rational action.
I expect ethnic identity among minority ethnic group members to be even more salient
and consequently more “sticky”. For example, in the US, whites comprise the dominant ethnic
majority. In recent history, the majority of whites vote for the Republican Party during
elections. If ethnic identity were absolutely fluid, and self-created, members of minority
ethnic groups could simply find other associations with Republicans, say religion or economic
class, and the Republican Party would gladly welcome their support. The problem is, ethnic
identity can be ascriptive. Minority ethnic group members are not immediately guaranteed
the same privileges as whites when they join predominantly white political parties, and it is
more likely that their interests specifically dealing with their ethnicity will be overshadowed
by the interests of the dominant ethnic group. Ethnic identity, then, is not defined solely
by an individual or an ethnic group, it is also a feature impressed upon individuals from
larger society. In the US, African Americans do not get to switch to another identity when
disproportionately targeted by police. Even third or fourth generation Latinos deal with

35

ethnic stereotypes concerning their citizenship status or language acquisition. However,
ethnic identity cannot be described as perfectly fixed either.

3.8

Proposed Solutions to Problem of Outbidding

The purpose of institutional engineering is to properly incentivize cooperation between ethnic groups within a country to prevent ethnic outbidding leading to conflict. As I have
demonstrated, potential for conflict is especially high for minorities constantly on the losing
end of policy decisions. So, institutions must reverse the destabilizing move toward ethnic
outbidding and integrate minority interests in a democratic system fundamentally based
on majority rule (Beissinger, 2008, 91). A successful solution would produce institutional
incentives for leaders of ethnic majorities as well as ethnic minorities to work together.
Furthermore, institutions should allow individual members of every ethnic group to attain
representation

4

at the national level through leaders accountable to their interests. When

ethnic constituents have alternative parties to choose from they can hold political leaders
accountable by voting out those that are unsatisfactory.
Chandra argues for methods of institutional articulation of ethnic group interest that
bolster cross-cutting cleavages of ethnic identity. In her model, Chandra identifies the way
this institutional design works to reverse the spiraling of ethnic outbidding and swing ethnic
elite preferences toward the center. At the level of the masses, institutionalizing cross-cutting
cleavages allow individuals a choice of party affiliations based on which aspect of multidimensional identity best suits their interest. Chandra (2005, 236) comes out against institutional
restrictions on ethnic party formation claiming that “a multitude of freely forming ethnic
majorities may be a more effective safeguard against the destabilization of democracy than
the imposition of constraints on any single one”.The model is plausible for a country like
India, where there are multiple cross-cutting cleavages of identity. In plural societies, where
cross-cutting identity cleavages do not exist, it is difficult to see how this institutional design
4

Some would argue that descriptive representation, or representation of marginalized individuals by members of their own identity group, is key here (Mansbridge, 1999)
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would prevent conflict between groups.
Chandra’s extension to the Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) ethnic outbidding model includes an additional assumption that ethnicity is not a fixed trait, but a fluid concept and
that individuals, imbued with multidimensional identities, may switch ethnic affiliations. In
other words, if any one dimension of ethnic identity could be easily cast aside in favor of any
other dimension then individuals would be able to choose a political party that offers the
greatest benefits based on that association. For instance, if an individual is a member of a
minority linguistic group that receives little public benefit that member could simply choose
to join a political party based on their religious affiliation instead. I find this assumption to
be problematic. Based on this idea, Chandra (2005, 242) asserts that:
Individuals care only about being members of the group that is promised rewards
by the winning party. Faced with a choice of party positions on different identity
dimensions, voters will favor the dimension of their identities that places them in
the majority group. Thus if they are in a majority or a minority on both dimensions, they will be indifferent between the two. But if they are in the majority on
one dimension and the minority in other, they will favor their majority identity.
I maintain, as I have argued above, that ethnic identity, while certainly socially constructed is not perfectly fluid, particularly to the extent that it corresponds with identifiable
physiological characteristics. I am also suggesting that even if the transition between one
identity affiliation to another were so simple and the ability to switch affiliations enabled
individuals a choice between parties, there is no proposed mechanism in place to prevent
ethnic outbidding. In this model, centrism is contingent on the institutionalization of a symmetric cleavage structure, where no primary ethnic group crosses the 50% threshold. She
shows that when cleavages are asymmetric “party competition should, in contrast, produce a
politics of competitive polarization”(Chandra, 2005, 243). In plural societies, without crosscutting cleavages, ethnic group elite have no incentive to moderate or appeal to members
outside of their own ethnic communities. Without incentives to produce centrism among
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elite there is no way to reverse the process of ethnic outbidding. Moreover, there is no way
to move away from the zero-sum game between ethnic groups.
In my review of the literature I discuss several other solutions proposed to manage prior
ethnic divisions and persistent hostilities in plural societies. Power-sharing is a strategy
intended to offer ethnic group members the ability to maintain representation and allow
elites to share control of government. Collective choice procedures that rely on cooperation
between ethnic party elites can only be stable when incentives to do so are high for all
parties. Lijphart emphasizes that consociational democracy “entails conscious cooperation
among elites of different communities to control the destabilizing effects of open ethnic
competition”(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1969, 19), a seemingly daunting task
even when highly incentivized (Horowitz, 1985, 2014). When one of the ethnic groups sharing
power is a clear majority the incentive to evenly split social goods wanes. However, even
when incentives for ethnic power-holding elites are high, their competitors have less incentive
to stick with the status quo. Additionally, Roeder (2005) points out that in power-sharing
situations, all issue matters remain ethnic and not national, reinforcing a constant zero-sum
game between groups. Due to the lack of integration, ethnic outbidding is the best method
of gaining support for the party. Finally, in power-sharing scenarios, majority groups retain
the agenda-setting power (Horowitz, 1985) which grants this group the ability to drown out
the competition.
Proportional representation can be beneficial, more so than plurality electoral systems,
in the sense that by facilitating entry of multiple parties in government, ethnic minorities
are much less likely to be excluded (Lublin, 2016). However, the incentive for extreme ethnic
outbidding among ethnic group elites is still present. As long as ethnic parties are formed
in plural societies, organizing politics along ethnic lines prevents party leaders from working
with other groups toward national goals. On its face, the PR institutional design would seem
to decrease polarization by eliminating the dilemma of minority ethnic groups being relegated
to permanant losing minorities on policy. The problem is that inclusion in government does
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not necessarily translate to real gains for the ethnic minority group. In some cases, coalition
formation can lead to greater agenda-setting power of multiple minority groups, but this
would not be true in countries with a large majority ethnic group.
I argue that implementing constitutional ethnic party bans with spatial distribution
requirements can provide the incentives necessary for ethnic elites to moderate as well as
offer members of ethnic groups, minority and majority, choice between parties. Moreover, I
argue that facilitating aggregation of ethnic group interests at the party level, through bans
on exclusively ethnic parties, can offer greater stability for new democratic institutions.

3.9

Ethnic Party Bans as a Solution to Outbidding

In my model, I assume that ethnicity can be somewhat fluid, but also characteristically
“sticky”. This is especially true for plural societies. Because of the stickiness, members of
an ethnic group cannot choose a different party that represents another identity dimension.
Instead, the only way to allow for choice between parties is to facilitate multiethnic parties.
Additionally, the only way to prevent elites from ethnic outbidding is to require elites to
recruit a nontrivial proportion of members from other ethnic groups.
I posit that institutions designed to facilitate interethnic cooperation through aggregation of preferences at the party level are more effective in reducing ethnic outbidding and
resulting conflict than institutional solutions designed to articulate preferences specific to
ethnic groups. This aggregation of multiple ethnic group interests can be achieved through
constitutional bans on exclusively ethnic parties. “Soft” bans, which simply prevent parties
from registering and/or competing in elections when membership is exclusive to one ethnic
party can achieve this goal as ethnic elites must work to become more inclusive of other
groups, subsequently reversing outbidding. By enforcing spatial distribution requirements,
“hard” bans ensure parties must work to gain a certain threshold of supporters from each
region of the country where distinct ethnic groups reside, going a step further to create multiethnic parties with national platforms, rather than a coalition of ethnic groups that may
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still exclude other groups 5 . Political elites must, then, expand party platforms to include
concessions for multiple ethnic groups that must be attracted in order to form a winning
coalition. These requirements begin a process of party competition over the support of multiple ethnic groups. To become competitive, leaders of nationalized parties need expand the
party platform to appeal to ethnic minority groups by promising to offer public goods across
cleavages, rather than promising exclusive gains to any one ethnic group. More importantly,
this institutional solution requires even majority ethnic groups to moderate and adopt a
position of cooperation between groups or face disqualification from electoral competition.
Ethnic party bans with spatial distribution requirements reduce ethnic conflict by affecting the incentives of both political elites and ethnic group members. First, bans eliminate
the incentive for ethnic outbidding among political elites. In order to obtain positions of
power, ethnic party elites can no longer shape platforms with promises of gains exclusively
to their own ethnic group. Instead, elites must compete to be the most inclusive, leading
to the formation of parties focused on the national over communal interest. This focus effectively eliminates the zero sum game between ethnic groups, rewarding elite centrism over
extremism. Secondly, constitutional banning also allows ethnic group members a choice between parties, but rather than having to prioritize aspects of identity (e.g. class status over
religious affiliation), as the Chandra model suggests, individuals have more than one multiethnic party to choose from. Interests specific to minority ethnic groups are not superseded
by interests of the larger ethnic group for when they are, members can make the choice to
join another, more appealing multiethnic party. Third, requiring a diverse party membership also solves the problem created by permanent ethnic majorities. Furthermore, parties
that cannot or will not alter their message to attract a diverse base will fail. When parties
fail, other parties that can diversify will replace them. Constitutional ethnic party bans,
5

Of course, for spatial distribution requirements to be effective ethnic groups must reside in fairly distinct
regions of a country. For example, if an ethnic majority had at least a small base of support in all regions,
spatial distribution requirements would not work to coerce diversification. Assuming regional segregation of
ethnic groups, especially in plural societies, holds up empirically. This is the reason ethnic party bans use
spatial distribution requirements, rather than establish a quota of minority ethnic group membership.
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thus should eliminate ethnic outbidding and the societal conflict that ethnic outbidding can
generate.

3.10

Model Predictions

Now that I have presented the theory the following argument explains how ethnic parties
create the conflict inherent in a plural society and how ethnic party bans may work to
preclude violent and nonviolent unrest. Once I address the ways the three conditions (ethnic
party, banned ethnic party, no ethnic party by choice) produce various preferences among
individual members of an ethnic group we can then tackle the problem of how we get from
ethnic antagonisms to protest/unrest.
The first prediction concerns the outcomes expected to follow from an ethnic group
having no exclusive ethnic parties, without the implementation of an ethnic party ban.
This will be the baseline. I assue that ethnic elites interested in forming an ethnic party
are able to do so in countries without constitutional party regulations prohibiting their
formation. Following Arrow’s Theorem, political behavior follows a basic pattern: “people
have preferences and seek to satisfy them subject to the political ‘rules of the game’ ”
(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Arrow, 1951). Since politics, and consequently the gains from
political victories, are not organized along ethnic cleavages, there is no reason to believe that
conflict as a result of being on the losing end of a particular policy would organize around
ethnic lines. In the absence of ethnic parties and more importantly ethnic outbidding, there is
no catalyst for increasing polarization between ethnic groups to arise from newly competitive
elections. In less democratic societies legitimacy issues can be expected to arise, and this
scenario will be examined below when institutional arrangements are given a more thorough
treatment.
So, what happens when ethnic parties enter the equation? Considering the options, in
the broadest of terms, we can expect that organizing ethnic parties will lead down a path to
either peace (status quo), or to conflict, be it violent or nonviolent.
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3.10.1

Ethnic Parties and Conflict

The phenomena of ethnic outbidding among ethnic group leaders vying for power in new
democracies is empirically established and fairly uncontroversial. The tendency of ethnic
elites to move toward ideological extremes to secure and mobilize an ethnic base has lead
to a vast literature positing myriad solutions to this problem, which I have outlined in
detail. Elite appeals to extreme ideology, of course, impact preference intensity of individual
members of the ethnic group toward gains specific to the ethnic group and also, typically, for
losses to rival groups creating deeper interethnic antagonisms. Furthermore, extremism does
not often foster trust in multiethnic democratic institutions, which makes ethnic outbidding
a vicious cycle. The lack of trust in institutions to secure fair outcomes, particularly for
ethnic minorities finding themselves in the permanent losing minority on policy outcomes,
further deteriorates the legitimacy of national institutions.
Preference intensity toward exclusively ethnic gains coupled with legitimacy lended to
government institutions affects whether group members opt for a violent or nonviolent outlet
to resolve policy issues. When group gains cannot be achieved through government channels,
the status quo is no longer an acceptable option. In order to select nonviolent demonstration
as the best course of action, individuals must believe that the action will create some sort
of change. A protest is essentially a drawn out vote, usually for a single preference issue,
which demands numbers and visibility and, by definition, a commitment to peaceful means.
Of course, extremist ideology does not usually endorse patience, and does not always draw
support from large numbers of an ethnic group. Furthermore, ethnic parties do not limit
agendas to singe issues, but rather promise to further a multiplicity of interests specific to the
ethnic group, and more importantly, against competing ethnic groups. Violent unrest occurs
when legitimacy assigned to government institutions is low, which is precisely what extremist
rhetoric can accomplish. Extremist outbidding galvanizes the notion that ethnicity largely
makes up the “substantial content of [one’s] individuality. [To] subordinate these specific and
familiar identifications in favor of generalized commitment to an overarching, and somewhat
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alien, civil order is to risk a loss of definition as an autonomous person absorbed in culturally
undifferentiated mass or worse dominated by another group” (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972,
66). To make matters worse, ethnic political entrepreneurs stress the nonnegotiable nature
of ethnic conflict with the idea that accommodation of opposing groups is a betrayal to one’s
own ethnic group. Violent conflict can satisfy the urgency of extremism, and it does not
require mass participation to produce its desired result, which leads to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Ethnic groups with exclusively ethnic political parties will engage in higher
levels of violent conflict than ethnic groups banned from forming ethnic parties and
those that choose not to form ethnic parties.
3.10.2

Ethnic Party Bans and Conflict

Hypothesizing that ethnic party competition produces increased violent conflict leads to
the question: does preventing ethnic party organization preclude unrest? If instituting
constitutional bans on ethnic party formation by enforcing spatial distribution requirements
can curb ethnic outbidding, ethnic leadership incentives change. It is no longer in the best
interest of ethnic elites, whether established elites or entrepreneurs, to appeal strictly to
ethnic identities in order to gain the support of a minimum winning base. Elites from different
ethnic groups must not just cooperate with each other within multiethnic parties, they must
also temper their platform to allow for moderation and establish agendas which promise
public goods availability to those outside ethnic group boundaries as well as those within.
It follows that without leaders engaging in extremist ethnic outbidding, preference intensity
toward exclusive gains for an ethnic group would not flare to the point of inciting unrest.
Moreover, nationalizing parties enhances institutional legitimacy for a couple of reasons.
First, without leaders stressing the importance of gains exclusive to the ethnic group and
instead emphasizing national goals, institutions that can deliver become more appealing.
Second, establishing multiethnic parties breaks the cycle of minority ethnic groups being on
the permanent losing side of policy.
Preventing ethnic groups from forming exclusively ethnic political parties is not the
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equivalent of preventing ethnic groups from all political representation, especially when ethnic party bans are equally applied across all ethnic groups by constitutional law. When
groups are banned from ethnic party organization, ethnic group leaders have a choice, and
that is to organize a political party that is not exclusively ethnic, facilitating, or perhaps
more aptly, coercing groups to collaborate across ethnic lines.
Hypothesis 2a: Ethnic groups banned from ethnic party participation will engage in lower
levels of unrest, both violent and nonviolent, as compared to ethnic groups that have
ethnic parties.
Though, even when ethnic constituents have choices between various multiethnic, national parties, some ethnic minority groups, especially those that have encountered prior persecution, may still not find their preferences sufficiently represented by the newly multiethnic
major parties, especially if those parties encompass groups that have done the persecuting.
Some countries host over 100 minority ethnic groups. Leaders of large multiethnic parties
must appeal to many ethnic groups in order to fulfill the spatial distribution requirement
specified in the constitution. However, they perhaps cannot always appeal to every small
minority group, even when policy gains are intended to be national rather than communal.
For a nationalized party to obtain a minimum winning coalition, the party does not need to
cater to the preferences of every ethnic minority, whether constitutional bans are “soft” or
“hard”. That is not to say that policy preferences are inextricably linked to ethnic identity.
For example, in many African countries, economic sectors correspond with specific ethnic
groups just as many ethnic groups reside in distinct regions. A national policy that undercuts
the livelihood of nomadic peoples or farmers, for instance, who are not necessarily considered
to be key demographics to the multiethnic party’s minimum winning coalition, is not a
communal policy by definition, but it is a policy that produces losses for specific ethnic
groups. That means some minority ethnic groups can encounter the same problem of being
relegated to a permanent losing position on policy according to their group interests. While
the opportunity to be included in national parties should confer some level of legitimacy to
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electoral institutions, when it comes to representation of group-specific interests, legitimacy
is lacking.
If ethnicity were perfectly fluid, members of these minority ethnic groups could simply
choose whichever multiethnic party they please, even if the party did not specifically cater
to the minority group’s preferences. But because ethnicity is sticky, minority ethnic groups
cannot simply abandon their ethnic affiliations when it seems to be in their interest. On the
one hand, in plural societies, historical ethnic relations can make it difficult for some groups
to work together in the same party, on the other, ascriptive characteristics make it difficult
to slip off ethnic identity for the sake of convenience.
In this situation, waning institutional legitimacy is less a matter of the institutions in
place (which benefit multiethnic interests), but more an issue of who controls the institutions
and the way the structure in place keeps those in power. Preference for group specific gains
remains intact, but I do not expect preference intensity to be extreme. Reversing the process
of ethnic outbidding will also ease ethnic tensions between groups. Even if some minority
groups are not equally represented, they are not actively antagonized by rival ethnic parties.
To be clear, in the absence of ethnic outbidding, which produces extreme preferences for
all groups to secure gains exclusive to their own ethnic groups, small minority groups may
have preferences for gains to their group that are not being incorporated into the nationalized
party agenda, but perhaps not the kind of radical preferences that produce violence. Instead,
peaceful demonstration is arguably the more effective tactic.
Hypothesis 2b: Minority ethnic groups banned from ethnic party participation will engage
in higher levels of nonviolent protest, as compared to ethnic groups that have not been
banned from forming parties.
3.10.3

Democracy and Party Type

Despite the cleavages produced by ethnic party affiliation, strong democratic institutions
that can facilitate cooperation between parties through adequate representation should alleviate the propensity toward civil conflict. Birnir (2007a) and Chandra (2004, 2005) offer
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compelling arguments for the way institutions can work to facilitate cooperation between
ethnic parties in a way that benefits the groups in particular and new democracies more
broadly. Their work points out that ethnic parties do not necessarily create greater conflict
potential when formed under the right conditions or funneled into the proper channels of
representation. While I have already discussed how these arrangements seem fairly difficult
to manage and may only leave ethnic groups in a fragile state of cooperation, it is useful
to explore the potential interactive relationship between democracy and ethnic parties and
how this influences conflict.
The two primary mechanisms, legitimacy and preference intensity, are both affected
by institutional structure of government and how open those institutions are to all ethnic
groups. Whether institutions provide fair opportunities for representation and outlets to
resolve grievances or if they instead work to serve the interests of a limited portion of the
populous, the direct impact on institutional legitimacy is clear and daunting. Open, democratic institutions should matter for preference intensity as well. Dealing with repression
and lacking an outlet or opportunity to get a fair shake somewhere down the line would, of
course, produce tensions for ethnic group members, particularly minority groups.
Let us walk back through the hypothesized scenarios discussed above and address how
each projection may be altered based on changes in strength of growing democratic institutions. Starting with violent conflict as an outcome, the theory of ethnic outbidding supposes
that ethnic groups with parties will exhibit greater levels of violent conflict, whereas ethnic
groups banned from forming ethnic parties would have an equally low level of violent unrest
as groups with no parties or bans. However, as I discuss in earlier chapters, a corpus of
literature developed by proponents of consociationalism argues that representation of ethnic groups through ethnic parties can be highly advantageous. I argue that power-sharing
and proportional representation do not offer strong enough incentives for ethnic elites to
moderate or cooperate. However, in strong democracies cooperation should be much easier
to facilitate. It also may be the case that in countries with greater democratic norms and
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practices, the kind of institutional compromises suggested to prevent ethnic outbidding that
facilitate articulation or aggregation of ethnic group interests will work better than they do
in newly democratizing countries, diminishing the positive impacts of banning ethnic parties.
It is also worth noting that ethnic outbidding is a process that occurs as plural societies
become open to multiparty electoral competition. Newly independent countries, or countries
moving away from a one-party system are, by definition, less democratic than those with
established electoral institutions. Therefore, ethnic party formation and competition would
be most dangerous for countries without well-developed democratic institutions. Entrenched
democracies, or those with free and fair elections, low corruption and repression, checks on
government overreach of power, etc, should bring about greater institutional legitimacy.
The legitimacy conferred by strong democratic norms and institutions should prevent even
extremist ethnic group leaders from mobilizing ethnic group members toward violence.
Hypothesis 3a: More democratic countries that facilitate representation of ethnic parties
will see less violent unrest among ethnic groups, while closed systems of government
will produce more conflict from ethnic parties.
The model expectation for ethnic group elites that have been banned from forming
parties is that their members will eschew violent conflict as they must move away from exclusively ethnic political associations in favor of those that are more inclusive. As ethnic
groups gain greater opportunity for representation through open, democratic institutions,
however, some ethnic minority groups may find they are less well-represented by established
nationalized parties. Minorities without equal access to the fruits of democracy may radicalize as the nation becomes more democratic and their interests are still left behind. For
minority groups that have banded together with larger ethnic groups some may come to find
their interests are not on equal footing with those of other larger ethnic groups within the
party. Both Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985) discuss how minority ethnic
groups members in plural societies generally fear intergroup collaboration which could result
in domination of the smaller group by the larger group.
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Alternatively, minority groups that find themselves lacking access to the nationalized
parties altogether may either be too small to have real bargaining power or find themselves
in the position to form a competitive opposition, which can make them targets of nationalized
parties. When multiethnic parties fail to benefit minority groups, even when they claim to
serve national interests, legitimacy may quickly diminish as the limitation of democratic
competition for minority ethnic groups has the potential to appear even more unjust as
democracy increases.
At a glance, one might assume that more repressive institutions may create greater
group incentives toward violence, across the board. In fact, there is some evidence that
more repressive institutions may actually benefit growing multiethnic parties by blocking
electoral prospects of regional competitors. In a recent empirical study of the causes of
party nationalization Lublin (2016, 9) finds that:
“Incentives, corruption, and force may result in more votes being cast or recorded
for the ruling, nationalized party. Countries with extremely high levels of repression, like Equatorial Guinea and North Korea, take this approach to the extreme
as they report almost all votes as in favor of the ruling party. But even less thoroughly illiberal regimes may still limit democratic competition, albeit to a less
drastic extent. Regimes that govern countries with weak identification with the
state may be especially likely to limit ethnic and regional parties that could form
the nucleus of opposition to either the government or the unity of the state.”
Thus, in democracies opposition has a better opportunity to form. The minority ethnic
groups forming the opposition create a problem for the nationalized party in power. Bans on
ethnic parties ensure that winning national parties can shut out smaller opposition leaders
whose only potential base would be ethnic. Well-established multiethnic parties may also
accuse rival opposition parties of assembling a primarily ethnic base in order to knock them
out of the race. In Tanzania, for example, well after independence, the majority multiethnic
party, Cama cha Mainduzi (CCM), attempted to choke out competition of opposition parties

48

with strong local bases of support that threatened to undermine the nationalized party’s
base in those areas (Kelsall, 2013). The CCM retained a hold on the state through popular
support for 20 years after independence. As democratic institutions strengthened, several
opposition parties developed, on in particular, NCCR-Mageuzi party, which stood a real
chance at challenging the regime. The CCM identified the NCCR-Mageuzi as a ‘Chagga’
party effectively labeling the party communal and unable to compete in elections. The
CCM did the same to the UDP and CUF, claiming each party was not representing national
interests (Bertrand and Haklai, 2014).
The failure of large multinational parties to represent the interest of some minority
ethnic groups I have already discussed. I expected minority groups without representation
in countries with ethnic party bans to engage in higher levels of protest. When the same
situation occurs in democracies, I expect ethnic leaders of minority groups to turn back to
ethnic outbidding, as mobilizing ethnicity in this way may be the only tactic left to combat
nationalized parties with a lock on elections. The increased preference intensity brought
about by outbidding and unequal access to government, as compared to other groups, should
lead to increasing violent unrest.
Hypothesis 3b: Banned parties will be more conflict prone in governments with open
democratic institutions than closed governments.
As far as levels of protest are concerned, I predict that repressive conditions will dampen
protest for ethnic groups regardless of party status. In more democratic conditions, both
ethnic groups with parties and those banned from forming parties may engage in greater
levels of protest, in order to bring issues specific to the ethnic group into the public eye.
This tendency may be greater for the ethnic group with an ethnic party as parties offer
organizational benefits that increase mobilization potential.
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Chapter 4

Data and Methods
In this chapter I begin by identifying my universe of cases, discuss the operationalization of
variables, and outline my data collection methods and sources. I provide graphic depictions
of the data as well as descriptive statistics. Finally, I clarify and justify my research design.

4.1

Measures

4.1.1

Universe of Cases

The following sections will present an analysis of the relationship between ethnic parties,
banned ethnic parties, and the intensity of internal political strife. Thus, the emphasis is not
on all ethnic groups, but ethnic groups that have the potential to engage in conflict. These
groups are established in the Minorities-at-Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project,
2009). Gurr (1994, 349) defines a minority at risk as a group which “collectively suffers, or
benefits, from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in the country or
countries in which it resides”.
The most recent dataset from MAR includes 337 ethnopolitical groups well suited for
a comparative analysis. Data covers the years between 1985 and 2003 and was collected by
John Ishiyama (2009)1 . Ishiyama followed Birnir (2007) to establish an appropriate universe
1

There has been an update of MAR data to cover years 2004 through 2006. Unfortunately, several key
variables have changed and no longer match up with earlier versions of the data. In particular, the indices of
economic and cultural differentials between ethnic groups has been eliminated, which serves as an important
group characteristic in my models.
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Protest Dependent Variable
No protest reported
Verbal Opposition (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications,
agitation, etc.)
Symbolic Resistance: Scattered acts of symbolic resistance (for example,
sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)
Small Demonstrations: A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,
total participation of less than 10,000.
Medium Demonstrations: Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,
total participation of less than 100,000.
Large Demonstrations: Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,
total participation greater than 100,000.

Table 4.1: MAR Protest Scale for Ethnic Group-Year
of cases using MAR. The sample only includes countries that had at least one “relatively
competitive” election from 1985-2003, in order to capture the effects of outbidding as a result
of electoral competition, resulting in a total of 213 groups from 82 countries.
4.1.2

Dependent Variables

I use two dependent variables measuring both levels of protest and levels of violent conflict to
allow for comparison to Ishiyama‘s analysis. Both are ordinal level measures with multiple
categories. The protest and rebellion indexes will be used separately from one another in
order to parse out different effects for either protest or rebellion and war. In order to capture a range of internal political unrest, I use the protest and rebellion indexes from MAR
(Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). Protest scores from MAR range from 0 to 5. Table 5.1
demonstrates the level of peaceful unrest each value represents. Each level of the variable
categorizes the amount of nonviolent activity observed as being produced by members of an
ethnic group. The MAR defines a nonviolent activity as that which does not cause physical
harm to another individual. Mention of symbolic acts of resistance, sabotage, and riots refer
to acts committed against nonhuman targets. The rebellion index from MAR, presented
in Table 5.2, ranges from low level violent unrest to protracted civil warfare and is ranked
from 0 to 7. The following listing demonstrates what each value represents within this index.
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Conflict Dependent Variable
None reported
Political banditry, sporadic terrorism (fewer than 6 events)
Campaigns of terrorism (more than 6 events)
Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale except cases that are the
beginning of a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the reported year.
Small-scale guerrilla activity which includes fewer than 1000 armed fighters, sporadic
armed attacks, and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group.
Intermediate guerrilla activity includes one or two of the defining traits of
large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity.
Large-scale guerrilla activity includes all of the following traits: more than
1000 armed fighters, frequent armed attacks, and attacks affecting large part of
the area occupied by the group.
Civil war: protracted civil war fought by rebel military has all the
characteristics of large-scale guerrilla activity, plus rebels control large scale
base areas that are secure over time.

Table 4.2: MAR Rebellion Scale for Ethnic Group-Year
4.1.3

Focal Independent Variable

Most variables on ethnic group characteristics come from the MAR, with the exception of
my focal independent variable, ethnic party status. Ishiyama (2009) employs Brass (1991)’s
definition of ethnic party for data collection purposes and operationalizes the concept defining
an ethnic party as an entity that either:
(a) proclaims itself as the primary representative of the ethnic group and only
that group OR
(b) is widely regarded as the first party to represent the interests of that group
and only that group. Thus, the definition would include parties that identify
themselves as the representative of a particular group (such as the Magyar Coalition in Slovakia or the Bodo People’s Liberation Front in India) as well as parties
that are widely regarded as ethnic despite proclaiming themselves officially as
nonethnic (such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria, which is
largely a party of ethnic Turks).
To create my focal independent variable I use information on ethnic party formation
from Ishiyama and add information on ethnic party banning. Data on banning was obtained
through the Comparative Constitutions Project web tool. The project was launched in 2005
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and through partnership with Google Ideas, collected, analyzed and organized thousands of
constitutional texts in a highly searchable format at constituteproject.org. I coded ethnic
parties as banned for each year during which the constitutional text expressly prohibited
party formation and/or existence based on tribalism, parochialism, language, regional sectarianism, etc. (excluding the prohibitions expressly based on limiting racial or national
hatred addressed in many constitutions) 2 .
I employ a less conservative criterion for bans than Basedau and Moroff (2011). Unlike,
Basedau and Moroff (2011), who only analyze party bans that are strictly observed in Africa
3

, my definition includes any constitutional ban placed on ethnic party organization spanning

a country, whether or not there are strong measures in place to curb party activity by groups
that have been banned. First of all, banning an ethnic party from participating in politics is
a symbolic act as well as it is pragmatic. A ban, then, no matter how harshly enforced, can
still produce ethnic group grievance. Secondly, even bans that are not well-enforced prevent
ethnic parties from political competition in a meaningful way, such as in cases where an ethnic
group can circumvent the ban to participate in elections. For instance, when a party includes
a small proportion of members not in the group or when the party’s name is not particularist
the party is not considered to be banned and retains the categorization of ‘party’. Third, even
if a ban is weakly enforced, ethnic groups banned from political competition via an ethnic
party arguably have less mobilization potential than ethnic parties that can openly organize
with government support. Finally, it is important to investigate whether “soft” ethnic party
bans work to prevent unrest, perhaps even more so than “hard”, strictly enforced bans as a
practical matter. If a simple alteration of rules reduces conflict there should be no need for
countries to go to the trouble of maintaining enforcement mechanisms.
2

In the tables and graphs describing the data I have included constitutional bans placed after 2006 (where
the sample is cut off). I am attempting to provide a full depiction of the proliferation of bans and where
they are implemented. It is also important to cover the more recent ethnic party bans to help identify model
performance on more current cases.
3
Another obstacle to relying on Basedau and Moroff (2011) is that their data sources are not altogether
transparent. The authors explain that their determination concerning which ethnic groups are subjected
to strongly enforced party bans is derived from multiple qualitative sources. It is therefore not possible to
extend their procedures of sample selection to party bans outside of Subsaharan Africa
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A variable capturing level of democracy is included to investigate an interactive effect
between ethnic party/ban and democracy on level of unrest. Data for this variable was
collected from the Polity IV database (Polity IV, 2009) and is based on the POLITY2 variable
4

. The indicator combines both scales of institutionalized democracy and institutionalized

autocracy together. The democracy portion is constructed to operationalize institutionalized
democracy, which is conceived of as:
“three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints
on the exercise of power on the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties
to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.”
The logic of the institutional autocracy portion of the scale is essentially the inverse. The
score for this variable ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). We
would expect that higher scores on the polity scale will have less potential for violent conflict,
though levels of nonviolent protest may be higher without the presence of autocratic rule
to suppress assembly. I mention above that I delimit my universe of cases, only including
countries with at least one somewhat competitive election, which may raise concerns with
respect to how well I can test the influence of democracy. However, despite requiring one
competitive election, the full range of the Polity2 scale appears in the data.
4.1.4

Ethnic Group and Country Level Controls

In order to replicate the original Ishiyama study, maintaining a baseline for comparison, I use
the same ethnic group and country-level control variables employed in the original models. To
test the relationship between ethnic group unrest and inequality between groups, I examine
the economic and cultural differences between ethnic groups within a country using indexes
4

“In 2002, a new variable was added to the Polity IV data series: POLITY2, in order to facilitate the use
of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. This variable modifies the combined annual POLITY
score by applying a simple treatment, or ‘fix’, to convert instances of ‘standardized authority codes’ (i.e.,
-66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).” See Polity IV Project:
Dataset User’s Manual for more information.
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from the MAR dataset (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). The cultural differentials index
assesses differences between the ethnic group and that of the other ethnic groups within
the country. It is measured on six dimensions of differing ethnicity/nationality, language,
traditions, religion, social customs, and residence. Like the group concentration variable, it
is listed as a scale from 0, equal to no difference and 4, equal to extreme differentials. The
economic differentials index is constructed the same way, based on six economic dimensions of
difference: income, land ownership, education, presence in commerce, presence in professions,
and presence in government. The scale ranges from -2 to 4 with low scores indicating
advantages for the ethnic group and high scores identifying severe disadvantage relative to
other groups in the country. In Ishiyama‘s original models these variables are collapsed into a
binary measure with low or no differences coded as 0 and substantial to extreme differentials
(2-4) coded as 1. For the purpose of retaining as much quantitative information as possible
I avoid the arbitrary dichotomization of these indexes.
Control variables that pick up impact of electoral institutional design are also added to
the model. In order to measure the potential for representation through electoral institutions
within a country I will take the natural log of the average district magnitude (Taagepera
and Shugart, 1989). Level of district magnitude (or average number of seats per legislative
district) is meant to capture the potential for representation and arguably serves as a better,
less blunt, measure of electoral system than a categorical variable for proportional representation as it captures the most important dimension of the electoral systems impact on
party behavior. This data was collected from the Political Institutions database from the
World Bank (Beck et al., 2001). I also include federal access to the executive as a measure of
degree of representation. This variable is a simple dummy variable with ‘1’ identifying that
the ethnic party held a cabinet portfolio in a given year. I also include a dummy variable
to control for federalist government type and a dummy indicating whether selection of the
executive is based on a simple plurality of votes.
The model includes a few controls for economic context, following from Ishiyama’s mod-
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eling strategy. Countries that have higher GDP per capita growth rates may have groups
that are less likely to engage in conflict because more people may have greater access to
economic opportunity. Thus, willingness may be less likely to surface in countries where
more members of ethnic groups have equitable access. Furthermore, we assess FDI/GDP as
a measure of increased globalization, which we assume will have a dampening effect on civil
unrest.

4.2

Describing the Data

In the process of collecting data on constitutional prohibition on political parties a clear
pattern of ban types emerged resulting in a fairly distinct categories. The majority of party
bans fell under the category of ‘ethnic’ as the language describing the prohibition specifically
stated that no political party may organize on the basis of ethnicity, region, religion, etc.
Cote dIvoire is coded as having an ethnic party ban for this entry: “Political Parties or
Groups created on regional, confessional, tribal, ethnic or racial bases, are forbidden.” The
Sierra Leone constitution of 1991 has similarly clear instructions forbidding ethnic party
formation:
No association, by whatever name called, shall be registered or be allowed to
operate or to function as a political party if the Political Parties Registration
Commission is satisfied that—
a. membership or leadership of the party is restricted to members of any particular tribal or ethnic group or religious faith; or
b. the name, symbol, colour or motto of the party has exclusive or particular
significance or connotation to members of any particular tribal or ethnic group
or religious faith; or
c. the party is formed for the sole purpose of securing or advancing the interests
and welfare of a particular tribal or ethnic group, community, geographical area
or religious faith; or
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d. the party does not have a registered office in each of the Provincial Headquarter towns and the Western Area.
The second distinct group is that of bans preventing parties from organizing with the
purpose of discrimination toward another group (ethnic or otherwise) or violence against
the state. The language of this type of constitutional prohibition is clearly worded with
the intent to prevent violence against other groups, specifically minorities. For instance
the Serbian constitution states, “Activities of political parties aiming at forced overthrow
of constitutional system, violation of guaranteed human or minority rights, inciting racial,
national or religious hatred, shall be prohibited.” In this example, the party itself is not
banned outright, but hostile actions by the party could lead to its prohibition. Other examples ban parties outright, while the language is still focused on the prevention of violence
and party behavior rather than its mere existence as an ethnically exclusive entity, as in
this excerpt from Uzbekistan’s constitution: “The formation and functioning of political
parties and public associations, aiming to do the following, shall be prohibited: changing
the existing constitutional system by force, coming out against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic, the constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens,
advocating war and social, national, racial and religious hostility, and encroaching on the
health and morality of the people, as well as armed associations and political parties based
on the national and religious principles.”
The third, somewhat catch-all, category I list as ‘vague’ due to the implicit, nonspecific
nature of the text. For example, Georgia’s 1995 constitution states “ Formation and activity
of public and political associations that aim to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional
order of Georgia, to infringe on the independence and territorial integrity of the country, or to
propagandise war or violence, to stir up national, ethnic, religious, or social animosity, shall
be inadmissible.” The vagueness of the language identifying that groups may not “stir up”
trouble between ethnic groups or infringe on territorial integrity does not explicitly forbid
the formation or organization of exclusive ethnic parties, though it appears to leave the state
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with a lot of room for interpretation and a lot of discretionary power to prevent political
representation. The wording is different from that of constitutions in the ‘violence/hatred’
category in that the security of the state is priority, rather than the protection of minorities
5

.
Prior to detailed analysis, some simple patterns emerge within the categories of ethnic

party ban types. First of all, while constitutional bans of ethnic parties occur across many
regions, when clustered by ban type it is clear that there is a relationship between region
and type of constitutional ethnic ban. The world map in Figure 5.1 displays the pattern.
What immediately stands out, perhaps unsurprisingly, is the preponderance of ethnic
bans in Africa. More importantly, Africa seems to place complete or vague ethnic bans on
parties without much regard for the prevention of violence against other ethnic groups or the
state. The constitutional bans that guarantee rights and protect minorities exist primarily in
Eastern Europe. Asian constitutional bans are primarily ethnic or vaguely ethnic, with just
two countries banned from ethnic party activities which incite violence or hatred. Figure 5.2
reveals the large contrast between regional ban types. Fifteen African countries have solid
ethnic party bans (21 countries have vague or ethnic bans), making up well over half the
sample of bans (23 countries total). Vague constitutional bans are more evenly distributed
by region.
The pattern of bans across regions gives rise to questions about the historical precedence
for implementing constitutional bans on politicizing ethnicity. It is also important to look at
the political atmosphere of the countries in order to get a sense of the purpose for the bans.
The tables below provide information on the year in which the constitution was created
or revised to reflect the language specifying the prohibition against ethnic party formation,
organization, or activity, the level of democracy as indicated by the Economist Intelligence
5

There is a fourth type of constitutional prohibition against political parties specifically designated for
groups that aim to destroy the territorial integrity of the state and its borders. The restriction does not
refer to ethnicity at all and is therefore excluded from the sample of bans. The countries with restrictions on
parties specific to state preservation are Sri Lanka, Poland, Mauritania, Liberia, Korea, Italy, and Germany.
Most of these bans are in older constitutions from countries that suffered from fascist takeovers or totalitarian
rule of some kind.
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Constitutional Ban Type

category
ethnic
vague
violence/hatred

Figure 4.1: Countries with Constitutional Ethnic Party Bans by Type
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Figure 4.2: Constitutional Ban Types by Region
Unit (High = Full Democracy, Mid = Flawed or Hybrid Regimes, Low = Authoritarian
Regimes) 6 , and whether or not the country has experienced a prior ethnic war (Sambanis,
2004). The tables are organized by constitutional ban type.
Over 60% of the countries with explicit ethnic party bans have experienced prior ethnic
conflict, based on the Sambanis definition. All countries in this group have suboptimal democratic institutions or political freedoms with the majority registering as fully authoritarian
regimes, and notably, there are no countries that meet the standards of full democracy. Table
5.3 looks very similar. Nine out of 13 countries with vague ethnic party bans have faced prior
ethnic warfare. Countries with vague prohibitions fare a little better when it comes to level
of democracy as much more of the sample qualifies as having at least mid-range democratic
traits, with one country (Romania) listed as a full democracy.

6
I use the EUI measure because its categorical ranking is less arbitrary than creating my own cut-off
thresholds out of the POLITY2 score.
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Constitutional Bans with Specific Language Banning All Ethnic Parties
Country
Ethnic War
Democracy
Constitution
Level (EIU)
Year
Algeria
Yes
Low
1989
Bulgaria
No
Mid
1991
Burkina Faso
No
Mid
1991
Congo
Yes
Low
2001
Cote d’Ivoire
Yes
Low
2000
Djibouti
Yes
Low
1992
Egypt
Yes
Low
2014
Gambia
No
Low
1996
Guinea Bissau
Yes
Low
1984
Kenya
Yes
Mid
2010
Kyrgyzstan
Yes
Mid
2010
Mexico
Yes
Mid
1917
Niger
No
Low
2010
Philippines
Yes
High
1987
Rwanda
Yes
Low
2003
Senegal
No
Mid
2001
Sierra Leone
Yes
Mid
1991
Tanzania
No
Mid
1977

Table 4.3: Country Information for Ethnic Party Bans
Constitutional Bans with Vague Ethnic Reference
Ethnic War
Democracy
Level (EIU)
Angola
Yes
Low
Armenia
Yes
Mid
Bhutan
No
Mid
Cape Verde
No
Mid
Central African Republic
Yes
Low
Gabon
No
Low
Georgia
Yes
Mid
Libya
Yes
Low
Morocco
Yes
Mid
Myanmar
No
Mid
Pakistan
Yes
Mid
Romania
Yes
High
Tajikistan
Yes
Low
Country

Constitution
Year
2010
1995
2008
1980
2013
1991
1995
2011
2011
2008
1973
1991
1994

Table 4.4: Country Information for Vague Bans
The patterns that arise in Table 5.4 tell a different story. It has already been mentioned
that these countries are predominantly European, but there are several other commonalities
among them that differ from countries with other types of party bans. Constitutional prohibitions on parties that advocate violence or hatred against ethnic or minority groups occur in
countries with different political and historical characteristics. Unlike countries with vague
or fully ethnic bans on party activity, countries with bans on parties that practice ethnic
discrimination have much higher average levels of democracy and are less likely to have been
involved in a prior ethnic war. Of course, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia have experienced
devastating ethnic conflict prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, with each territory drafting
new constitutions post-independence that reflect a strong interest in avoiding ethnic tensions
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Constitutional Bans Against Violence or Exclusion of Ethnic Groups
Country
Ethnic War
Democracy
Constitution
Level (EIU)
Year
Albania
No
Mid
1998
Belarus
No
Low
1994
Chile
No
High
1980
Croatia
Yes
High
1991
Estonia
No
High
1992
Macedonia
No
High
1991
Madagascar
No
Mid
2010
Montenegro
Yes
High
2007
Serbia
Yes
High
2006
Ukraine
No
Mid
1996
Uzbekistan
No
Low
1992

Table 4.5: Country Information for Bans Against Violence toward Ethnic Groups
and consequent violence, though without denying the salient role of ethnicity embedded in
the cultures and political institutions of each country. All three countries register as fulldemocracies according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, as do most countries with this
type of political party prohibition. Only two out of 11 countries are considered to be full
autocracies.
For the analysis, I decide to exclude constitutional bans pertaining to the prevention of
violence and hatred against other groups for the following reasons. First, the prohibition of
parties espousing hatred or instigating violence should not have a the dampening effect on
political representation of ethnic groups that is expected to occur when ethnic groups are
banned from forming political parties7 . In fact, many of the constitutions that do not permit
organization based on hatred use clear language promoting the protection of ethnic group
interests that may be compromised by hate groups. Second, banning violent parties should
not prevent the politicization of ethnicity either, an effect I expect bans to produce. Instead,
constitutional bans on parties preaching hate or violence against other groups should actually
preserve the ability of minority groups to politically organize without fear of consequences
from another party espousing threats.

7
To reiterate, when a constitution that prohibits parties threatening violence also places a ban on ethnic
party formation outright it falls in the category of ethnic ban or vague ban, contingent on the language.
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Figure 4.3: Party Status Count
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 display the distribution of cases between the three categories of ethnic
party status. In Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 I present descriptive statistics for all country-level
variables and ethnic group level characteristics.
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Figure 4.4: Party Status Percent

4.3

Empirical Strategy

Ishiyama (2009) employs ordered logit and simple t-tests of means to test the influence of
ethnic parties on intensity of both violent and nonviolent unrest. Ishiyama concludes that
his results are mixed as the ordered logit finds a positive significant association between
party formation and conflict while the t-tests show no association. I intend to replicate and
extend the analysis by performing Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling regression
analysis (Young, Leeuw and Takane, 1976; Young, 1981; Jacoby, 1999). The ALSOS method
will allow me to obtain information about the measurement properties of the two ordinal
dependent variables essentially to determine whether the measures optimally provide ordinal
level information or if the variables can be transformed in a way that allows me to treat them
as continuous.
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Variable
Protest

Rebellion

Democracy

Plurality

District Magnitude

FDI/GDP

Growth

Levels
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all

n
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645

Min
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-8.0
-9.0
-8.0
-9.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-29.0
-3.0
-7.0
-29.0
-22.0
-31.0
-31.0
-31.0

Max
5.0
6.0
5.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.9
5.0
5.0
5.0
13.0
58.0
45.0
58.0
22.0
19.0
13.0
22.0

x̄
1.2
0.8
1.6
1.1
0.4
0.5
1.3
0.7
0.2
0.9
4.1
1.6
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
1.1
1.5
1.1
1.2
2.3
2.3
2.0
0.8
1.0
2.4
1.3

s
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
2.2
1.7
6.1
6.2
5.4
6.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.2
1.5
1.5
1.4
3.3
4.9
3.8
4.2
5.0
5.6
5.0
5.3

#NA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.6: Country Characteristics by Constitutional Party Ban Status
Ishiyama (2009), not sufficiently satisfied with the results, reduces the sample to compare
conflict levels of groups before and after the inception of ethnic parties8 . According to the
results of a t-test of means, ethnic groups are not more prone to violent conflict after forming
parties, though they do exhibit higher levels of protest. Overall, Ishiyama concludes, though
results are mixed, ethnic parties produce more protest but equal levels of violent conflict.
My empirical contribution to the study of ethnic parties and conflict is twofold. First, I
add to the assessment of the impact politicization of ethnicity has on conflict by comparing
levels of conflict produced by ethnic parties to that of conflict produced by ethnic groups
8

His argument against accepting the results of the ordered logit is that groups that form ethnic parties may
already be more prone to conflict and this is why they form parties. However, if prior unrest is responsible
for explaining higher levels of conflict among ethnic parties, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
should wipe out the impact of ethnic parties on rebellion. It does not.
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Variable
Group Con

Economic Dif

Cultural Dif

Levels
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all
Ban
None
Party
all

n
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645
707
1187
751
2645

Min
0
0
0
0
-2
-2
-2
-2
0
0
0
0

Max
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

x̄
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.2
1.4
1.5
2.0
1.6
2.7
2.4
3.1
2.7

s
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.7
2.0
1.8
1.9
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.1

#NA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.7: Ethnic Group Characteristics by Constitutional Party Ban Status
banned from forming ethnic parties. To compare levels of conflict between ethnic parties
and groups banned from forming ethnic parties, I create a new variable to capture the
implementation of an ethnic ban, detailed in the data section above. I then incorporate ethnic
party status into the baseline models of conflict (Ishiyama, 2009) as my focal independent
variable.
Second, I rigorously examine the cause of Ishiyama’s mixed results between his two models, which could be due to the lack of contextual control variables in the t-test or difference
in level of measurement of the dependent variables. Results of Ishiyama’s (2009) study are
contradictory when the level of measurement of the dependent variable is treated as ordinal
versus continuous. This may have to do with Ishiyama’s untested assumption concerning the
level of measurement assigned to the data for either of the two MAR dependent variables
for violent conflict and protest intensity. But which level is most appropriate? After all,
variables capturing ‘intensity’ should arguably exhibit a latent continuous trait. At least
that is what a researcher may theorize. Even the selection of the ordered logistic regression requires that the dependent variable ‘as though it were measured on an ordinal scale,
but the ordinal scale represents a crude measurement of an underlying interval/ratio scale’
(Long, 1997) as well as assuming some distance (though not a constant distance) between
levels. The problem is that determining level of measurement typically lies primarily in
the theory of the researcher without any consideration of the information provided within
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the data, which gives rise to contradictory results between models examining similar phenomena(Jacoby, 1999). One popular solution to check for ordinality is the Brant test of
the parallel regression assumption. Only, first, a failing test is often not considered strong
enough evidence to reject the usage of ordered logistic regression. Secondly, a failing test
would only suggest that multinomial logit may be more appropriate. Without knowing any
more about the measure, treating the DV as nominal could lead to an even greater loss of
efficiency and interpretable results.
Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling (Young, Leeuw and Takane, 1976; Young,
1981) is a statistical technique designed to produce quantitative models from qualitative,
categorial data. When working with an ordinal dependent variable there are clearly limitations present. The most obvious is that ordered categories express no definitive statement
regarding the magnitude of distance between categories. Instead, arbitrary numbers are assigned to categories (typically ordered integers) and the researcher carefully interprets results
one category at a time. Sometimes, especially in instances where the ordinal DV has more
than five categories, researchers are inclined to interpret movement up or down the ordering
scheme as if the measure was continuous. Of course, incorrectly assuming relatively equal
intervals in category spacing can lead to biased results in models suited for continuous DVs.
Fortunately, the ALSOS method can improve upon this issue of level of measurement
selection. By extracting information from the model and using the information to assign
appropriate, non arbitrary numerical values to categories of the dependent variable we can
circumvent the problem of choosing inaccurate models that poorly fit the data. The extraction process works iteratively between both sides of the regression equation and results in
a rescaled version of the dependent variable that may be treated henceforth as continuous
(Young, Leeuw and Takane, 1976). That is, the researcher assumes an level of measurement
which permits various transformations. For example, if the researcher assumes the variable
is ordinal in nature, then any transformation that preserves the initial ordering of the categories is acceptable and the model uses a least squares approach to find the transformation
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of the original values, subject to the order constraint, that maximizes the model’s R-squared.
The resulting transformed variable, then, has an optimal linear relationship with that particular set of independent variables. Not only does this technique provide a valid measure of
distance between categories but by doing so it also allows vast improvement in interpretation
and graphical presentation within an OLS framework.
The analysis proceeds the following way. I first replicate the ordered logit model replacing the binary ethnic party variable with the three category dummy variable that includes
information on ethnic bans. I then perform Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling to
assess the best category spacing for the ordinal protest and rebellion variables and create
new dependent variables based on those results and rerun the regressions. In the next step,
I specify a multiplicative model including an interaction term between party/ban and level
of democracy to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.
Finally, to cover any problems caused by issues of endogeneity, I calculate multinomial
propensity scores with the ‘Toolkit for Weighting and Analysis of Nonequivalent Groups’ or
twang package in R (McCaffrey et al., 2013). Unlike methods of propensity score estimation
using simple logistic regression models with iterative variable section, twang employs machine
learning methods in the aim of reducing bias and mean-squared error (Lee, Lessler and
Stuart, 2010). Specifically, scores identifying the average treatment effect on the population
are generated using a Generalized Boosted Model (GBM), which is an “iterative process with
multiple regression trees to capture complex and nonlinear relationships between treatment
assignment and the pretreatment covariates without over-fitting the data” (McCaffrey et al.,
2013).
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Chapter 5

Analysis
5.1

Comparing Ordinal and Linear Model Frameworks

For the analysis, I begin by adopting the same approach as Ishiyama (2009), conducting
time series cross sectional ordinal logit analysis to determine the probability of each level
of protest and conflict for each ethnic group in the sample per country-year. My summary
replication of the original ordered logit models produce identical results, therefore, in the aim
of brevity, I do not reproduce the findings here. In summary, the original results illustrated
a significant, independent relationship between the presence of an ethnic party (the focal
IV) and increased levels of both protest intensity and conflict intensity. The model exhibited
reasonable goodness of fit. I find the same psuedo R square that Ishiyama reports in the
original analysis: 0.55 for the protest models and 0.62 for violence. A great deal of the
variation in the two dependent variables is described by the lagged endogenous dependent
variables included to correct for autocorrelation (Ishiyama, 2009). However, even with the
inclusion of lagged conflict variables, ethnic parties still have a significant, positive effect on
both types of unrest. The institutional variables that Ishiyama argued to be most influential
on mitigating unrest in both peaceful and violent forms (constraints on the executive and
levels of democracy) overall did not add to our understanding of this phenomenon, with the
exception of access to the executive, which proved to reduce the probability of group protest
and rebellion. Finally, the economic control variables included in the model were insufficient
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to explain levels of unrest.
Before rescaling the dependent variables, I rerun Ishiyama’s original ordered logit models
replacing the original binary focal independent variable, ethnic party status (party vs. no
party) with my categorical independent variable indicating whether an ethnic group has
an ethnic party, no party, or is banned from party activity. Results are reported in Table
6.1. Once replacing the binary ethnic party predictor with the ethnic party/party ban
categorical variable and running the ordered logit column 1. shows that ethnic groups with
an ethnic party engage in significantly higher levels of violent conflict than groups with
no party or ban (the omitted category), positively confirming Hypothesis 1. Because I
included a lagged rebellion variable in the models I argue that the effect ethnic party has
on the increase of violent conflict cannot be attributed to prior conflict. Ethnic party ban is
also positively associated with greater levels of violent conflict, contrary to Hypothesis 2a.
Political institutions (Federalism and Log District Magnitude) also increase propensity for
violent conflict, as they had in Ishiyama’s original models. Ethnic group level indicators,
group concentration and economic differentials between the ethnic group and other groups,
also had a positive relationship with heightened violence.
In column 2. of Table 6.1, presents the results of the ordered logit for protest levels.
In this model, ethnic parties also have a significant, positive impact on increasing levels
of nonviolent protest. Ethnic party bans, however, have a negative, nonsignificant effect
on protest, which suggests a rejection of hypothesis 2b. Other interesting differences between violent and nonviolent unrest models are the significant relationships of the political
indicators, level of democracy and plurality, with protest behavior. In the protest model,
cultural differentials predict larger nonviolent demonstrations, whereas economic differences
and group concentration do not.
Finally, column 3. illustrates how the multiplicative rebellion model panned out. Turning the attention to the interaction effects, increased levels of democracy does not impact
the association between ethnic party and violent unrest, casting some doubt on Hypothesis
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Table 5.1: Ishiyama Replication: Ordered Logistic Regression
Dependent variable:

Lagged Rebellion

Rebellion

Protest

Rebellion Interaction

(1)

(2)

(3)

∗∗∗

1.375∗∗∗
(0.047)

1.379
(0.047)

1.453∗∗∗
(0.043)

Lagged Protest

Ban

0.555∗∗∗
(0.215)

−0.050
(0.137)

0.613∗∗∗
(0.216)

Party

0.498∗∗∗
(0.148)

0.411∗∗∗
(0.095)

0.451∗∗∗
(0.168)

Federalism

0.386∗∗
(0.163)

0.109
(0.106)

0.429∗∗∗
(0.166)

Democracy

0.010
(0.012)

0.015∗
(0.008)

−0.008
(0.020)

Plurality

0.026
(0.188)

0.200∗
(0.119)

0.020
(0.191)

District Magnitude

0.147∗∗
(0.057)

0.060∗
(0.036)

0.162∗∗∗
(0.059)

Group Con

0.257∗∗∗
(0.079)

0.001
(0.038)

0.252∗∗∗
(0.079)

Cultural Dif

0.052
(0.066)

0.087∗∗
(0.041)

0.052
(0.066)

Economic Dif

0.069∗
(0.040)

−0.006
(0.023)

0.077∗
(0.041)

FDI/GDP

−0.027
(0.018)

−0.008
(0.011)

−0.032∗
(0.018)

Growth

0.008
(0.012)

−0.007
(0.008)

0.008
(0.012)

Ban:Democracy

0.073∗
(0.040)

Party:Democracy

0.019
(0.026)

Observations

2,606

2,606
∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

2,606
∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01
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Figure 5.1: Party Regulation and Democracy Interaction Effects on Rebellion
3a. Level of democracy does affect the relationship between ethnic party ban and unrest
in a positive direction, lending support for Hypothesis 3b. The addition of the interaction
significantly improves the fit of the model, according to an ANOVA test and significant multiplicative coefficient. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a graphical demonstration of the interaction
effect. Groups with ethnic parties maintain a fairly consistent predicted level of conflict at
all levels of democracy, with perhaps a very slight (but nonsignificant) decrease. Bans, on
the other hand, have a positive slope along increasing values of democracy. Groups without
bans or parties show decreasing propensity for conflict as democracy levels rise, which seems
to be a pretty intuitive phenomena. While the change is significant, it is not large.
Figure 6.3 displays differing slopes of protest over levels of democracy for the three types
of group. All of the slopes are positive, but the party slope is the largest, followed by banned
groups, and then groups with no party or ban, which is practically flat. The data indicates
that protest levels, under authoritarian rule, are equally low, and increase at different rates
as levels of democracy increase.
The results of the ordered logit match those reported by Ishiyama (2009). Though, as
discussed in previous sections, Ishiyama reported mixed results once he treated the depen-
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Figure 5.2: Party Regulation and Conditional Effects on Rebellion
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Figure 5.3: Party Regulation and Democracy Interaction Effects on Protest
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dent variables as continuous and performed t-tests comparing means. In this second step,
Ishiyama (2009) finds that ethnic parties are not more prone to conflict than other groups. I
report the same models in the linear framework in Table 6.2. The change completely wipes
away the significance of ethnic party bans on violent conflict, and remains nonsignificant in
the protest model. Some of the political and ethnic-group level predictors appear to have the
same effect on conflict and protest (Democracy, Group Concentration, Cultural Differentials,
and Economic Differentials), but many of the political indicators that were not significant
in the ordinal logit model are significant predictors in the linear models.

5.2

Comparing Ethnic Groups by Ethnic Party Status

Turning the focus again to the primary relationship of interest, effects of ethnic parties and
ethnic party bans on conflict, it is necessary to dig into the comparison in violent or protest
outcomes between groups with parties and banned groups. So far, we have only seen each
group compared with the reference category (groups with neither an ethnic party nor a
ban). Instead of refitting the model with each category omitted for reference, I deal with the
issue by reporting Quasi-Standard Errors (Firth, 2000, 2003; Firth and deMezezes, 2004) to
summarize all the covariances among parameters and test for the difference between each
group. Table 6.3 reports quasi-standard errors and variances for each category of ethnic
party status on violence intensity and Figure 6.4 presents the differences visually.
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Table 5.2: Linear Models
Dependent variable:

Lagged Rebellion

Rebellion

Protest

Rebellion Interaction

(1)

(2)

(3)

∗∗∗

0.826∗∗∗
(0.011)

0.828
(0.011)

0.661∗∗∗
(0.015)

Lagged Protest

Ban

−0.006
(0.052)

0.004
(0.056)

0.005
(0.056)

Party

0.149∗∗∗
(0.041)

0.213∗∗∗
(0.044)

0.120∗∗∗
(0.047)

Federalism

0.074∗
(0.044)

0.148∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.083∗
(0.044)

Democracy

−0.001
(0.003)

0.008∗∗
(0.003)

−0.005
(0.004)

Plurality

−0.025
(0.051)

0.088
(0.055)

−0.034
(0.052)

District Magnitude

0.0001
(0.016)

0.030∗
(0.017)

0.003
(0.016)

Group Con

0.042∗∗
(0.017)

0.022
(0.018)

0.043∗∗∗
(0.017)

Cultural Dif

0.014
(0.017)

0.030∗
(0.018)

0.016
(0.017)

Economic Dif

0.017∗
(0.010)

0.0001
(0.010)

0.019∗
(0.010)

−0.011∗∗
(0.004)

−0.003
(0.005)

−0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.003
(0.003)

−0.003
(0.004)

0.003
(0.003)

FDI/GDP

Growth

Ban:Democracy

0.009
(0.010)

Party:Democracy

0.009
(0.007)

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

−0.070
(0.074)

0.033
(0.080)

−0.069
(0.074)

2,606
0.735
0.734
0.863 (df = 2593)
600.160∗∗∗ (df = 12; 2593)

2,606
0.520
0.518
0.925 (df = 2593)
233.984∗∗∗ (df = 12; 2593)

2,606
0.735
0.734
0.863 (df = 2591)
514.563∗∗∗ (df = 14; 2591)
∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01
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Figure 5.4: Comparing Parties, Bans, Neither: Violence Intensity
Table 5.3: Rebellion Model: Quasi-Standard Errors Comparing Levels of Party Status
Level
None
Ban
Party

Estimate
0.0000
0.03226626
0.62215447

SE
0.0000
0.09584177
0.07403258

Quasi-SE
0.03781810
0.08806496
0.06364444

Quasi-Var
0.001430209
0.007755437
0.004050615

Figure 6.4 displays differences in violent conflict estimates between each group. Two
graphs are presented, one with the relationship between groups within the full linear model
without adding the lagged rebellion variable, and the other controlling for prior political
violence. In the regression table, it is clear that groups with ethnic parties engage in more
violent conflict than the omitted category (no party/no ban). But the difference between
groups with parties and groups with party bans was not demonstrated. In Figure 6.4 it is
apparent that groups with no ethnic party or ban have comparable (low) levels of violent
conflict to groups that are constitutionally banned from forming ethnic parties. But groups
with ethnic parties have significantly greater propensity toward conflict than both groups,
at least in the model that does not control for prior violence. The second subfigure does
not show the same relationship. Controlling for prior violence, groups with ethnic parties
engage in unrest at significantly higher degree than groups in the omitted category, but the
large error band in the banned group category slightly overlaps with that of the ethnic party
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group. All in all, groups with ethnic parties have greater violence potential, even when
taking violent conflict into account.
In Figure 6.5 the relationship between ethnic party status and protest activity level is
similar and more clear. Groups with ethnic parties engage in more intense levels of protest,
as compared to both groups with ethnic party bans and groups with no parties or bans.
Whether controlling for prior levels of protest or not, the relationship is the same. In both
cases, displayed in both subfigures, groups with ethnic party bans have significantly lower
levels of protest intensity, on par with levels seen in groups with no parties that have not been
constrained from forming ethnic parties by a constitutional ban. Support for Hypothesis 1.
is consistent, yet Hypothesis 2b., stating that groups banned from ethnic party formation
will engage in greater levels of protest, does not pan out.
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Figure 5.5: Comparing Parties, Bans, Neither: Protest Intensity
Table 5.4: Protest Model: Quasi-Standard Errors Comparing Levels of Party Status
Level
None
Ban
Party

Estimate
0.0000
0.06814527
0.60226368

SE
0.0000
0.07457324
0.05760379

Quasi-SE
0.02942577
0.06852220
0.04952091

Quasi-Var
0.0008658759
0.0046952915
0.0024523207

Still, there remains a troubling inconsistency between the ordinal models in Table 6.1
and the linear models in Table 6.2. Treating the dependent variable as discrete levels rather
versus continuous produces two contradictory results concerning the conflict potential of
ethnic groups banned from forming ethnic parties. The difference could raise questions as
to which model may be more appropriate, based on the way the dependent variables protest
and rebellion are measured. The issue is that the two modeling strategies produce different
results, meaning that our conclusions seem to be sensitive to the way we decide to treat
the dependent variable. Though, to clarify, I am not arguing that treating MAR conflict
or protest levels as ordinal is wrong and considering them to be continuous is correct, or
vice versa. In fact, following Jacoby (1999, 271), I am casting doubt on the perspective
that “measurement characteristics constitute a fixed and immutable property of the data”.
Instead, I proceed by adopting an alternative approach to the data under investigation by
considering “characteristics such as levels of measurement associated with particular vari-
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ables are viewed as testable hypotheses about one’s data, rather than a priori assumptions”
(Jacoby, 1999, 272). Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling can help avoid the problems
of assuming a level of measurement purely on the researchers’ theory by allowing the data
to determine the best assignment of numeric values “in terms of goodness of fit between the
analytical model and a set of empirical observations” (Jacoby, 1999; Young, 1981, 281).

5.3

Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling Regression

I employ the Alternating Least Squares Optimal Scaling (ALSOS) method to generate optimally scaled values, based on the information derived from the models, for both dependent
variables. Both ALSOS plots of protest and rebellion demonstrate that a transformation
is necessary in order for the variables to be assigned values that speak to the underlying
measurement properties detected from the data.
Rebellion ALSOS
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Figure 5.6: ALSOS Rebellion Measure
The results of rescaling the rebellion intensity variable, presented in Figure 6.6, suggest
an interesting transformation. What the model implies is that the categories of the variable
do not map well onto evenly spaced integer values. In other words, plots of optimally scaled
categories of rebellion (y-axis) versus original integer coding (x-axis) demonstrate that, with

79

Protest ALSOS

6

Optimally scaled values

5

4

●

●

5

6

●

3

●

●

2

●

1

0

●

0

1

2

3

4

Original data values

Figure 5.7: ALSOS Protest Measure
respect to this model, the categories are not really evenly spaced. After optimal scaling,
values can be characterized more fittingly with about three categories. The move from no
rebellion to small bursts of political banditry and sporadic terrorism ( 0 to 1 in the original
coding), is now represented by a more sizable jump and is undifferentiated from slightly
higher levels of violence (campaigns of terrorism and local rebellions). The move from local
rebellion to smaller scale guerrilla activity produces another step up in the rescaled measure,
and the rest of the high end of the violence scale (intermediate guerrilla activity, large scale
guerrilla activity, and civil war) hang together as the same value in the optimally scaled
rebellion variable.
The comparison of original values and optimally scaled values of protest intensity, displayed in Figure 6.7, has a different pattern than that of rebellion. Rescaled values match
up more closely to original values, for the most part, except at the middle and highest levels.
Nearly every one integer increase in the original values is accompanied by some increase in
the rescaled variable. The move from zero protest to the slightest amount of protest is coded
as a more sizable jump in the rescaled variable. The jump is much larger in the rebellion
variable, but still worth noting here. An increase from the level of protest categorized as
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scattered acts of symbolic resistance and small demonstrations (2 to 3) is rescaled as nearly
the same value. Original values for medium and large demonstrations (originally values 5
and 6) are also assigned similar values in the optimally scaled variable.
Once rescaled I compare the raw model fit with the optimally scaled model fit. Table 6.8
reports the rebellion additive and multiplicative models side by side, without the inclusion
of lagged rebellion. I will present the models with the lagged DV below, but it is important
to understand how well the model fits without adding the variable with the majority of
explanatory power, first. One issue with comparing unscaled with scaled models, after the
inclusion of the lagged DV, is that the lagged DV was not included in the rescaling process.
This is because rescaling the DV using information from the lagged DV would have resulted
in the rescaled variable being heavily determined by itself. Therefore, the scaled models that
include the lagged DV do not appear to be fitted as well as the unscaled version, because
the lagged DV is not explaining as much variance in the DV as it had prior to rescaling.
Rescaling improved the fit of the rebellion model, prior to controlling for the lagged
DV, without changing key relationships. The process of rescaling has the value of improving
efficiency without adding bias. Groups with ethnic parties tend toward higher levels of
rebellion than groups with no party or ban and groups banned from ethnic party formation do
not significantly differ from groups with no party or ban, with respect to violent conflict. The
multiplicative rescaled rebellion model indicates the same interaction between banning ethnic
parties in democratic environments raising the conflict potential of those ethnic groups, with
no change for ethnic groups with parties in changing levels of democracy.
Figure 6.8 shows the difference in conflict estimates between each group of interest,
controlling for lagged rebellion. In comparison to the way the groups looked in the model
with original rebellion values, we can see that ethnic groups with banned parties are much
more similar to groups with parties, with respect to violent behavior, than in the unscaled
models.
The fit of the raw versus rescaled models shows a slight improvement, less so for the
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Table 5.5: Rebellion OS Model Comparison
OS
OS Multiplicative
(Intercept)
−0.660∗
−0.654∗
(0.135)
(0.134)
Ban
0.111
0.240∗
(0.095)
(0.101)
∗
Party
0.639
0.546∗
(0.073)
(0.084)
∗
Federalism
0.303
0.333∗
(0.080)
(0.080)
District Magnitude
0.049
0.061∗
(0.029)
(0.029)
Plurality
−0.102
−0.133
(0.093)
(0.093)
Democracy
0.001
−0.018∗
(0.006)
(0.008)
∗
Group Con
0.315
0.317∗
(0.030)
(0.030)
∗
Cultural Dif
0.084
0.088∗
(0.030)
(0.030)
Economic Dif
0.100∗
0.107∗
(0.017)
(0.017)
FDI/GDP
0.002
−0.001
(0.008)
(0.008)
Growth
0.006
0.007
(0.006)
(0.006)
Ban:Democracy
0.074∗
(0.019)
Party:Democracy
0.031∗
(0.012)
N
2606
2606
R2
0.121
0.127
2
adj. R
0.118
0.123
Resid. sd
1.571
1.566
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

protest DV, unsurprisingly, as the suggested DV transformation did not deviate much from
the original values. Nonetheless, it produces a better dependent variable for the purposes of
linear estimation. The model fit, with the inclusion of the lagged protest variable, is slightly
better than the original protest model, as compared to the improvement in fit between the
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Table 5.6: Rebellion Models Including Lagged Dependent Variable
OS
OS Multiplicative
(Intercept)
−0.369∗
−0.368∗
(0.080)
(0.080)
Ban
0.074
0.146∗
(0.056)
(0.060)
∗
Party
0.189
0.220∗
(0.044)
(0.050)
∗
Lagged Rebellion
0.785
0.785∗
(0.011)
(0.011)
∗
Federalism
0.142
0.134∗
(0.047)
(0.048)
District Magnitude
0.048∗
0.048∗
(0.017)
(0.017)
∗
Plurality
0.132
0.137∗
(0.055)
(0.056)
Democracy
0.002
0.001
(0.003)
(0.005)
Group Con
0.063∗
0.062∗
(0.018)
(0.018)
Cultural Dif
0.028
0.027
(0.018)
(0.018)
Economic Dif
0.043∗
0.045∗
(0.010)
(0.010)
∗
FDI/GDP
−0.017
−0.019∗
(0.005)
(0.005)
Growth
0.004
0.004
(0.004)
(0.004)
Ban:Democracy
0.034∗
(0.011)
Party:Democracy
−0.007
(0.007)
N
2606
2606
R2
0.691
0.692
2
adj. R
0.690
0.691
Resid. sd
0.932
0.930
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

original rebellion model and the optimally scaled rebellion model. That is, the lagged protest
DV fits the rescaled protest variable model as well as in the original because it is very similar
to the DV.
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Figure 5.8: Party Status Effects on Rescaled Rebellion with Lagged DV
In Tables 6.9 and 6.10, the same model comparisons are presented for the protest intensity dependent variable. Rescaling improves the fit of the model a little and ethnic party
affiliation increases the propensity of heightened protest, contrary to Hypothesis 2b. Banned
groups do not differ from unbanned groups in terms of their protest intensity. The rescaled
model indicated a change in sign on the banned dummy variable beta coefficient, though
still not significant.
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Table 5.7: Protest Model Comparison
OS
OS Multiplicative
(Intercept)
0.298∗
0.301∗
(0.106)
(0.105)
Ban
0.056
0.100
(0.074)
(0.079)
∗
Party
0.679
0.591∗
(0.057)
(0.066)
∗
Federalism
0.364
0.390∗
(0.062)
(0.063)
∗
District Magnitude
0.083
0.091∗
(0.022)
(0.023)
Plurality
0.252∗
0.226∗
(0.073)
(0.073)
∗
Democracy
0.032
0.020∗
(0.004)
(0.006)
Group Con
0.004
0.005
(0.023)
(0.023)
Cultural Dif
0.093∗
0.097∗
(0.024)
(0.024)
Economic Dif
−0.028∗
−0.024
(0.014)
(0.014)
FDI/GDP
−0.011
−0.012∗
(0.006)
(0.006)
∗
Growth
−0.012
−0.011∗
(0.005)
(0.005)
Ban:Democracy
0.030∗
(0.015)
Party:Democracy
0.027∗
(0.010)
N
2606
2606
R2
0.152
0.155
2
adj. R
0.148
0.151
Resid. sd
1.230
1.228
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Figure 6.9 reveals a clear, significant difference in protest intensity between groups with
ethnic parties and groups banned from party activity. The estimate for banned parties is just
slightly lower than that of groups with no ban or party, but the difference is not significant.
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Table 5.8: Protest Models Including Lagged DV
OS
OS Multiplicative
(Intercept)
0.067
0.068
(0.078)
(0.078)
Ban
−0.009
0.016
(0.055)
(0.059)
∗
Party
0.286
0.265∗
(0.043)
(0.050)
∗
Lagged Protest
0.665
0.664∗
(0.014)
(0.014)
Federalism
0.054
0.062
(0.047)
(0.047)
Plurality
0.146∗
0.139∗
(0.054)
(0.054)
∗
Democracy
0.011
0.007
(0.003)
(0.004)
District Magnitude
0.028
0.030
(0.017)
(0.017)
Group Con
−0.006
−0.006
(0.017)
(0.017)
Cultural Dif
0.023
0.024
(0.018)
(0.018)
Economic Dif
−0.005
−0.004
(0.010)
(0.010)
FDI/GDP
−0.001
−0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
Growth
−0.005
−0.005
(0.004)
(0.004)
Ban:Democracy
0.015
(0.011)
Party:Democracy
0.007
(0.007)
N
2606
2606
R2
0.533
0.534
2
adj. R
0.531
0.531
Resid. sd
0.912
0.912
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

5.4

Dealing with Endogeneity

While the aforementioned results do suggest a significant association between involvement
(or the enforced lack thereof)in ethnic parties and levels of conflict intensity, there is more
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Figure 5.9: Party Status Effects on Rescaled Protest
to be done when it comes to determining the causal nature of this relationship. Much of the
issue with endogeneity can be attributed to the fact that ethnic groups are not randomly
assigned to treatment groups of no party, ethnic party, and party ban. Fortunately, there is a
useful method of group assignment of observational data to improve causal inference in this
matter. Propensity score techniques, until very recently, have been primarily employed to
balance binary treatment groups. The method has since been extended, by Imai and van Dyk
(2004) to balance multiple treatment groups with numerous examples of practical application
(Huang et al., 2005; Frolich, 2004; Zanutto, Lu and Hornik, 2005; Riley, Rieckmann and
McCarty, 2008).
Ethnic groups do not have an equal probability of ending up in one of the treatment
groups. Instead, there is some unknown conditional probability of an ethnic group organizing
an ethnic party or for an ethnic group to face restrictions on the formation of an ethnic party,
due to the lack of randomization in group assignment. The conditions, however, can be
considered to be structural, based on both group characteristics and country characteristics
obtainable within the observational data. I will estimate the conditional probability, or
propensity scores, of selection into treatment groups with the appropriate variables. By
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doing so I can assume the remaining variation in the treatment is random and therefore
the process that generates the additional variation is ignorable or independent (Morgan
and Winship, 2007; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). I calculate the estimator defined by the
pretreatment variables I identify below to derive the average treatment effect (Morgan and
Winship, 2007).
The pretreatment variables selected to control for imbalances between treatment groups
are as follows. First, I use the MAR variable ‘catness’ which is a measure of strength of ethnic
group identity. The more salient ethnic identity is to a group the more likely the group should
be to fall into the ethnic party category or banned party (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).The
two country level variables I use for pretreatment are ‘durable’, from the Polity IV dataset
and ‘region’. Durable identifies the number of years since the most recent regime change. As
newer democracies seem to be more vulnerable to ethnic party fractionalization, and ethnic
party bans are often put in place in the aim of protecting fragile democratic institutions this
is included. Recent power change may also create the sense that organizing ethnic parties to
become involved in competitive elections is necessary. Finally, the region variable is included
as some regions, notably Africa and parts of Europe, are more apt to ban ethnic parties,
some areas are more likely to see their formation, and other regions are less likely to see
either phenomenon. These factors can also be considered to have an independent impact on
propensity toward greater conflict intensity.
I calculate multinomial propensity scores with the ‘Toolkit for Weighting and Analysis of
Nonequivalent Groups’ or twang package in R (McCaffrey et al., 2013) to assess the average
treatment effects of each group (ATE). Unlike methods of propensity score estimation using
simple logistic regression models with iterative variable section, twang employs machine
learning methods in the aim of reducing bias and mean-squared error (Lee, Lessler and
Stuart, 2010). Specifically, scores identifying the average treatment effect on the population
are generated using a Generalized Boosted Model (GBM), which is an “iterative process with
multiple regression trees to capture complex and nonlinear relationships between treatment
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Figure 5.10: Optimize Plots:
assignment and the pretreatment covariates without over-fitting the data” (McCaffrey et al.,
2013).
GBM-based propensity score estimation requires a few choices concerning balance criteria. First, I select an appropriate number of regression trees to grow, as to avoid making the
models too complex (or not complex enough to provide balance). The default is 10,000 trees,
which is what I used. There are two available measures of balance, absolute standardized
bias (effect size) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. I use both to assess balance and
the mean of the covariate balance metrics as a stopping rule to summarize across covariates.
The plot diagnostic graph presented in Figure 6.10 shows that this is an appropriate number
of maximum iterations to optimize the balance statistics, as weights change very little at the
upper end of number of iterations.
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The graphical diagnostic used to test the assumption that each experimental unit has a
non-zero probability of receiving each treatment is presented below (Figures 6.11, 6.12, 6.13)
to help exhibit the overlap of the empirical propensity score distributions. What we want
to see in the boxplots is weighted treatment group means producing consistent estimates
of population means. Overlapping boxplots indicate that any ethnic group, per countryyear could have the chance to end up with one of the three group conditions of having an
ethnic party, an ethnic party ban, or neither. The graphs show the distribution of estimated
propensity scores across treatments. Figure 6.11 depicts my estimation of a propensity
score model for the ethnic party treatment category, showing the estimated distribution of
propensity scores in each treatment group. According to McCaffrey et al. (2013, 23) “[t]here
are no specific rules for what constitute sufficient overlap but substantial overlap of the
boxplots is desirable”. The assumption appears to be generally met, though there may be
some issues with the balance in the banned treatment group (as it has the smallest number
of cases).

Figure 5.11: Assessing Overlap: Party Sample Scores Across Groups
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Figure 5.12: Assessing Overlap: No Party or Ban Scores Across Groups

Figure 5.13: Assessing Overlap: Party Ban Scores Across Groups
5.4.1

Gauging Overlap of Propensity Score Distributions

Next, I present graphs to display the assessment of balance between treatment groups. The
graph below demonstrates to what extent the weighting process has pulled down the maximum pairwise absolute standardized difference. In other words, the left side of each plot
shows the magnitude of differences between groups on each pretreatment covariate before
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Figure 5.14: ASMD between Treatment Groups
propensity score weighting. Proper weighting will balance out the treatment groups in a
way that reduces these differences, in our case, on region, ethnic salience, and durability of
regime. What we see is that the maximum ASMD decreases for all pretreatment covariates.
The solid red circles indicate the statistically significant differences between covariates before
and after weighting. Figure 6.15 exhibits the balance plots for individual treatment group
fits.
Finally, once assessments of balance have been confirmed, I rerun the original models
using propensity score weighting. Results are presented for each dependent variable in Table
6.9. The relationship between ethnic party status, after propensity score weighting, and
intensity of conflict (optimally scaled) changes slightly. The intensity of rebellion increases
significantly among ethnic groups with an ethnic party. For groups banned from party
organization, as compared to groups with no party or ban, there is no change in violence. In
other words, after modeling the selection process that would bias which treatment category
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Figure 5.15: Balance Plots for Individual Fits
each falls into( party, ban, or neither) and adjusting to remove the bias, we can be even more
confident that nonrandom noise is not driving the results.
Another interesting difference between the models before and after propensity score
weighting is that most political institutions and economic indicators now appear to influence
intensity of violent conflict. I expect that the weighting process removed significant bias that
may have been driving some of these results in prior models (perhaps balancing treatment
groups on ‘region’ specifically). That said, every group level indicator still matters for violent
conflict as there is a positive relationship between increased group concentration, cultural
differentiation, and economic differentiation and greater levels of violent unrest.
For protest intensity, having an ethnic party has no significant impact as compared to
groups with no party or ban. The difference between groups with no party or ban is also not
significantly different from groups that are banned from forming an ethnic party. Unlike the
violent conflict model, the protest model indicates that almost none of our model indicators
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significantly predict intensity. In fact, the only predictor that influences protest, aside from
prior levels of protest, is cultural differentials between ethnic groups.
Table 5.9: Weighted Propensity Score Models
Rebellion Protest
(Intercept)
−0.66∗
−0.10
(0.10)
(0.10)
Lagged Rebellion
0.78∗
(0.03)
Lagged Protest
0.68∗
(0.03)
Ban
0.10
0.08
(0.05)
(0.05)
Party
0.23∗
0.03
(0.08)
(0.08)
Federalism
−0.00
0.01
(0.05)
(0.06)
∗
Democracy
0.01
0.01
(0.00)
(0.01)
Plurality
0.24∗
0.08
(0.08)
(0.07)
District Magnitude
0.07∗
0.03
(0.03)
(0.03)
Group Con
0.25∗
0.07
(0.05)
(0.06)
Cultural Dif
0.23∗
0.27∗
(0.05)
(0.06)
∗
Economic Dif
0.19
−0.02
(0.06)
(0.05)
FDI/GDP
−0.01
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
Growth
0.01∗
−0.00
(0.00)
(0.01)
N
2606
2606
AIC
7993.05
7596.07
BIC
8298.84
7901.08
log L
−3944.53 −3746.03
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05
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5.5

Discussion of Model Results

5.5.1

Ethnic Parties

After analyzing the relationship between ethnic party status and both violent and nonviolent
conflict employing several modeling strategies, rescaling the dependent variables based on
information from the data, and carefully managing potential endogeneity issues with techniques appropriate to enhance causal inference for observational data, at least one conclusion
can be drawn with a great deal of confidence. Ethnic groups that form exclusively ethnic
political parties engage in significantly greater levels of rebellion and protest than groups
with no party, and often appear to engage in significantly less conflict than groups that
are banned from forming ethnic parties. This robust result suggests that Ishiyama’s (2009)
findings that, in some cases, ethnic parties do not influence greater levels of unrest, are
driven by either problems with measurement, allowing for too much error in the models by
failing to hold constant important factors across countries or ethnic groups, or by including
some groups (with lower levels of conflict) that have been banned from party activity in the
wrong category of having an ethnic party. The consistent result that ethnic parties produce
higher levels of violent conflict lends support to Hypothesis 1. It was not my expectation
that ethnic party formation would produce greater levels of nonviolent conflict, but it is an
interesting finding worth further investigation.
Ishiyama (2009) also claims that ethnic groups with ethnic parties may appear to have
more intense conflict simply because these groups engage in greater conflict to begin with,
which explains why they form parties in the first place. Once performing further robustness
checks which involve including a lagged version of both violence intensity and protest intensity on the right-hand side of each equation it seems that while prior conflict explains almost
50% of the variation in both conflict intensity models it fails to wipe away the relationship
between ethnic party presence and conflict. Additionally, if prior conflict leads to formation
of parties, and this drives the relationship between parties and conflict, we would expect
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ethnic groups banned from forming parties to have equally high levels of conflict potential.
Based on results, ethnic groups with parties engage in higher levels of both violent conflict and protest. According to the theory, preference intensity for exclusive ethnic group
gains, driven by ethnic outbidding, should create fertile grounds for violent conflict. I hypothesized that ethnic groups with parties would have less trust in institutional change
achievable through nonviolent demonstration. It seems as if preference intensity can also
motivate protest. Perhaps both types of conflict are, more or less, different tactics fueled
by the same motivations. The two conflict processes are not mutually exclusive. It is difficult to separate out whether different members of the group are engaging in one process or
another, or if demonstration leads to outbursts of violence. These are limitations inherent
in group-level vs. individual-level data, further limited by yearly estimates (as opposed to
more fine-grained data).
5.5.2

Ethnic Party Bans

The effect of ethnic party bans was not as strong and consistent as that of ethnic parties,
and in some instances performed against expectations. Hypothesis 2a. stated that ethnic
groups with party bans will engage in lower levels of unrest. In the first ordinal logit model it
seems that groups with ethnic party bans have significantly greater levels of violent conflict
than groups with no party or ban. However, when analyzed in the linear framework, there
is no significant difference in rebellion between groups with no party or ban and groups with
party bans. Comparing quasi-standard errors we can see that groups with ethnic party bans
engage in significantly lower levels of conflict than groups with parties.
In the protest models, groups banned from ethnic party formation have similar levels of
protest intensity to that of groups with no party or ban, while groups with ethnic parties
are significantly more active in larger demonstrations, which contradicts expectations stated
in Hypothesis 2b. The relationship carries through all models, except the final propensity
score weighted model. One interpretation is that constitutional bans that prevent the politicization of ethnicity really ease tensions between groups, cooling preference intensity toward
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exclusive group gains so much that even nonviolent conflict is less necessary. Another explanation is that “soft” ethnic party bans capture too much variation by encompassing groups
that never would have formed parties, groups encouraged from forming more inclusive coethnic coalitions, and groups harshly repressed from any civic participation. Finally, the lack of
both conflict activities could be a matter of logistics. All parties, ethnic or otherwise, are organizations and as such have certain organizational capabilities. Ethnic parties motivate and
mobilize through ethnic outbidding, producing greater conflict. But mobilization requires
more than just extreme preferences. It takes organization. Groups banned from forming
ethnic parties lack some of the organizational tools that ethnic parties have to demonstrate
in large numbers.
To explore the mobilization theory more deeply I also test to see whether an increase in
ethnic party age has an effect on conflict intensity. After all, the longer an ethnic party has
been around the more established or organized they are likely to be which should impact
their ability to mobilize the group. I find a significant association between the two when
truncating the sample to only include groups with ethnic parties, presented in Table 7.1
(0.03, s.e. 0.01, p<0.001).
Table 5.10: Effect of Party Age on Conflict Intensity
Rebellion
(Intercept)
1.03∗
(0.12)
Party Age
0.03∗
(0.01)
N
655
2
R
0.06
adj. R2
0.06
Resid. sd
2.03
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Groups with ethnic party bans behave like groups with no party and no ban, in terms of
violent unrest, and produce significantly (or close to significantly) less violence than groups
with ethnic parties, in all models except the final model that includes weighted propensity
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scores. When groups are balanced in ethnic salience, region, and regime durability, ethnic
groups banned from party activity engage in equal levels of violent conflict than groups with
no party or ban and those with ethnic parties. Some of the results here support claims made
by Basedau and Moroff (2011) in their empirical examination of ethnic party bans in Africa,
in that, in few cases party bans appear to reduce violent conflict (measured in various ways),
but mostly, levels of conflict before and after bans do not change. However, I find that, at
least in a larger, global, sample of “soft” ethnic party bans, bans appear to at least diminish
the level of conflict strongly associated with ethnic party involvement.
5.5.3

Democracy

The indicator approximating levels of democracy does not have a consistent independent
relationship with violent conflict intensity, providing enough empirical support to reject the
alternative hypothesis 3a. There is no significant association between democracy and rebellion detected in the original Ishiyama ordered logit model, and it does not register as an
important indicator of violence in the conflict models with my optimally scaled DV. Level of
democracy does have a more consistently significant, direct impact on protest in a positive
direction. By assessing the effect of democracy on protest for each ethnic group, based on
ethnic party status, it appears that greater levels of democracy increase the intensity of
protest for all groups, but the effect is largest for groups with ethnic parties, followed closely
by groups banned from ethnic party formation. In support of Hypothesis 3b., there is a
consistently significant interaction between ethnic party status and democracy when predicting intensity of rebellion, at least for ethnic groups banned from ethnic party formation.
Climbing levels of democracy increase violent conflict for groups with bans.
The theory posits a couple possible scenarios for the phenomenon. On the one hand,
ethnic party bans may prove to be a barrier to representation of minority ethnic group interests once large nationalized parties have established dominance and this barrier proves
unacceptable in light of enhanced freedoms lopsided in favor of other groups. On the other
hand, more democratic institutions may offer ethnic minority groups the long awaited op98

portunity to establish meaningful opposition, which the ruling regime finds unacceptable.
The attempt to obtain government positions through local elections has often been met with
challenges by the party in power. In some instances, the opposition minority parties are
accused of being particularist and disallowed from democratic competition. Turning back to
the interaction presented in Figure 6.1, even though greater democracy levels significantly
increase violent tendencies, the change in predicted values (0 to 1) is not large and still
remains lower than that of ethnic groups with ethnic parties. This situation will be explored
in more detail in the case studies.
5.5.4

Comparison between Measures and Models

In summary, when treating the dependent variables, rebellion and protest, as ordinal versus
continuous, we get different results with respect to the association between ethnic party
bans and unrest. So, instead of relying on only my intuition regarding the appropriate level
of measurement, I turn to the data and the model to inform my choice and rescale the
dependent variables based on that information.
While rescaling the ordinal dependent variables did not radically change the results of
either model the exercise is informative in several ways. Practically speaking, taking level of
measurement more seriously by allowing the data to lend credence to our theories about the
structure of our variables we can choose better fitting models and stop settling for ‘mixed’
results produced by models chosen without thorough consideration of the data. Furthermore,
presentation of findings can be greatly improved within the OLS framework. This scaling
technique also improved the fit of each model without leaving us exposed to risk of increased
bias.
Finally, utilizing causal inference techniques for analyzing observational data, I attempt
to ensure that my results are not driven by differences between groups with particular ethnic
party status, other than party status, that influence propensity toward unrest. I argue
that the geographical region of the ethnic group, the level of ethnic salience attributed to
the group, and time since last regime change, are all factors that can impact whether an
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ethnic group forms a party, a country decides to place a constitutional ban on ethnic parties,
or neither. These factors may also have links to rebellion and protest. Balancing groups
using weighted propensity scores removes this potential bias and results in changes in some
key relationships. Balancing groups in the rebellion model causes many of the variables to
have influence on rebellion, whereas in models without weighting they did not. The protest
model, however, does not reveal much information on causes of protest, with the exception
of cultural differences between groups 1 .
In the following chapters I aim to provide a deeper look at some of the mechanisms
discussed above, as well offer more detailed explanation of where the models might have
come up short.

1

That, or prior protest is now wiping away the influence of other indicators.
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Chapter 6

Illustrative Examples of Constitutional Ethnic Party
Bans
6.1

Ethnic Party Bans in Action: Successes

In this chapter I provide some qualitative context to illustrate the way my model mechanisms
operate on the ground. I present a detailed discussion of several historical narratives of the
process of constitutional banning of ethnic parties to support by quantitative findings. The
first three cases I present showcase countries in which ethnic party bans were successfully
implemented and forestalled ethnic outbidding and subsequent unrest.
I selected countries with constitutional bans that have implemented clear, specific spatial distribution requirements. Each country has a different pattern of ethnic composition,
colonial history, and electoral design in order to dig a little deeper into the way the control
variables work in my statistical models. The countries I chose to demonstrate examples of
failing ethnic party bans, Algeria and Djibouti, provide excellent examples of heavily lopsided
ethnic group composition where extreme majorities dominate government from the time of
independence. In these examples, constitutional bans fell short of their goal to nationalize
political parties. The failures also shine a light on the problems involved with preventing
ethnic conflict while ideological/religious conflict seeps into newly democratic governments.
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6.1.1

Ethnic Outbidding

Literature is rife with examples of ethnic outbidding produced by ethnic party formation
in newly competitive democratic arenas. In Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), the model of
ethnic outbidding is verified with evidence from numerous cases in societies characterized
by various types of ethnic configurations including those in which an ethnic group makes
up the dominant majority, dominant minority, and more diverse, fragmented ethnic polities.
Extremism is found to be rampant during the shift toward democratization, even after long
stretches of accommodation of differences prior to ethnic party bids for power (Rabushka
and Shepsle, 1972, 207).
Horowitz (1985, 2007) cites numerous examples of power-sharing failures, though Lijphart counters with just as many instances of success. Federalism exhibits fewer examples
of failures, but notably remains the least popular electoral design in the world, so there are
also few examples of success. One instance of a federalist success commonly referenced in
the literature lies in the example of India. India serves as a particularly instructive case in
which institutional practices of articulating ethnic group interests into government works to
stabilize democracy, but does not demonstrate that encouraging the politicization of ethnicity resolves communal conflicts. The patronage democracy Chandra (2004) describes has
proven to facilitate ethnic parties that are small, fractionalized by cross-cutting cleavages,
though interethnic violence has not subsided.
6.1.2

Successful Constitutional Ethnic Party Bans

Depending on the measure of success or failure used to assess party banning institutions, there
are numerous examples of constitutional prohibitions on particularist parties easing ethnic
tensions in competitive politics. In some instances bans reduce violence, as in Rwanda, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In the scant empirical research on ethnic party banning, it appears that,
at least in SubSaharan Africa, ethnic groups engage in comparable levels of conflict before
and after party bans are implemented (Basedau and Moroff, 2011). However, forestalling es-
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calating conflict that breeds from ethnic outbidding can also be counted as a success. Bans
may also require time to take effect. The recruitment effort of a party to reach beyond
its base, especially when spatial requirements dictate reaching into other regions, to gain
multiethnic support could take time.
What does seem clear is that spatial distribution requirements for party membership,
designed similarly to a federalist electoral system, has produced promising results in terms
of creating parties with a national, rather than communal, presence. Two examples of this
requirement in effect are Kenya and Tanzania. Both countries have presidential, first-pastthe-post (FPTP) electoral systems, and have constitutional ethnic party bans that require
pan-ethnic representation within parties based on a quota of regional membership.
6.1.3

Nigerian Case

Nigeria is an interesting success story as it was once selected as an exemplary display of
the process of ethnic outbidding by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). Nigeria falls into the
category of a dominant ethnic majority configuration. Transitioning from colonial rule to independence proved challenging due to entrenched Nigerian nationalism among ethnic tribes.
Ethnic political parties formed to advance group specific interests based on tribal/regional
interests. The make-up of ethnic political parties during the dissolution of British colonial
rule was as follows:
“Azikiwe, an Ibo, formed the Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, later renamed the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC); Yoruba nationalism
first appeared in the Egbe Omo Oduduwas, a cultural organization founded in
1948, which subsequently became active in politics as the Action Group (AG);
and, finally, Hausa interests were expressed by both the colonial authorities and
the traditional rulers until the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) was formed to
contest the 1951 elections.”
Independent Nigeria was established as a parliamentary system with a federalist electoral design. The first competitive election was held December 12, 1959. Violence erupted
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periodically throughout the campaign and during election time with frequent outbreaks of
interethnic violence as party members were stoned in all three major ethnic regions. The
Northern People’s Congress won the majority of seats in the House (134), though the remaining parties, consisting of five ethnic groups and two independent groups, formed a coalition
as together they held 148 seats in total.
Unfortunately, open democratic elections were short lived as the control of government
was snatched from the NPC via a military coup which took place in January 1966. The
Constitution was thrown out and a unitary, military government was established. During
the coup Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and two regional Premiers were assassinated. A provisional military government headed by an Ibo, Major General Johnson
Aguiyi-Ironsi, took over the duties of both the federal and regional governments (Anber,
1967). The new arrangements clearly favored the Ibo interests at the expense of Hausa interests. Hausa Northerners reacted in outrage and a series of riots broke out in the North
with attacks targeting Ibos. In July of 1966, just months after the first military coup, a
second coup led by Northerners in the Nigerian army overthrew the military regime of Ibo
Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi and replaced him with a Hausa military leader. Within a few
months the Eastern Region had seceded and declared itself the independent state of Biafra.
The frequent, violent transitions of power through repeated coups were followed by three
years of civil war ending with the surrender of Biafra in 1970 (Anber, 1967).
Civil war eventually fizzled, most likely due to war fatigue produced by over 100,000
military casualties and between one and two million civilian deaths from secondary effects
of war. Military government continued to rule Nigeria , however, and was plagued by many
more coups and coup attempts until a short reprieve of electoral democracy between 1979
and 1983. During this time a new constitution was formulated which changed the structure of
federalism in efforts to loosen the hold of divisive, exclusionary ethnic parties. Reilly (2006,
40) describes the regulations spelled out in the new Nigerian constitution which “required
successful presidential candidates to gain a plurality of votes nationwide and at least a quarter
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of the votes in 13 of Nigeria’s then 19 states. In 1989, this provision was made even more
onerous, requiring a president to win a majority overall and at least one-third of the vote in
at least two-thirds of all states in the Federation. In the event that no candidate meets this
requirement, a runoff election is required”.
Nigeria experienced several more military coups, as no other legitimate transfer of power
between ethnic groups was available, and became, again, subject to military rule for another
14 years. Under the rule of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was appointed to facilitate a transition to civilian rule through
democratic elections. The new president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was committed representation of all Nigerians and preventing backsliding into dictatorship. Under his guidance a new
constitution was established in 1999 which specified a series of party regulations for banning
ethnic parties, retaining spatial distribution requirements addressed in the 1983 constitution
(Bogaards, 2010).
The Nigerian case of constitutional ethnic party banning is considered a success for a
couple of reasons. First, Nigerian ethnic party bans are more than merely symbolic. Bogaards (2010) finds that between 1989 and 2002 64 political parties were denied registration
by the Nigerian government on the grounds of failing to form a coalition with a national presence. Following the constitutional ban and appeals for multiethnic representation coming
from President Obasanjo, elites have developed informal practices intended to reduce ethnic
and religious political mobilization. Zoning practices also ensure certain political offices are
reserved for members of particular regions or ethnic groups (Suberu, 2001). Secondly, immediately following the constitutional ban, the 1999 election worked reasonably well, especially
considering the troubled history of Nigerian elections. Perhaps the most convincing evidence
of the ban’s effect was that it seemed to work in practice. Obasanjo “ran on a cross-ethnic
platform and in fact gained greater votes outside his own region than within it– precisely
because, it appears, he campaigned on a cross-regional, multi-ethnic platform”, winning in
1999 with around 60% of the vote, and again in 2003 by nearly the same margin (Reilly,
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2006, 821).
Success of Nigerian institutions to prevent outbidding and establish lasting democratic
peace is met with skepticism by others. For Basedau and Moroff (2011), Nigerian constitutional banning was only a small part of a larger effort to ease ethnic tensions and regulate
distribution of political power. It is also important to note that unrest was not entirely
diffused by the change in constitutional party regulation. Election tampering, intimidation,
and political thuggery still occurred in the 1999 election. At most, Basedau and Moroff
(2011) admit that banning political parties did not lead to an increase in violence in Nigeria.
Considering the prior historical strife between ethnic groups, not to mention that Nigeria
already had fully formed ethnic parties responsible for perpetrating the violence, it is not obvious how a party ban would immediately result in a drop-off in violence between groups, at
least not until the wounds caused by prior outbidding heal through moderate, multinational
coalitions.
Of course, since the establishment of the 1999 Nigerian constitution the country has
been plagued with a great deal of violent unrest. Getting to the root of current hostilities
requires understanding the context of Nigeria’s economic and political struggles. As the
biggest oil producer in Africa, Nigeria has lagged behind in the development of infrastructure
and a diversified economy. Rampant corruption has eroded the legitimacy of government
institutions and is at least partially responsible for the rise of popular political Islam in the
Northern regions. Boko Haram emerged in the northeast region of Kanamma in 2003 as
a pushback against Western-style secular institutions. Terrorist attacks carried out by the
group escalated over the next fifteen years, culminating in the April 2014 kidnapping of 276
teenage girls from a school in northeast Chibok.
Despite the waves of Islamist terrorism faced by Nigerians, there is little sign of interethnic unrest. The one exception is the occurrence of some intercommunal violence in the
middle-belt region, which can be attributed to the competition for access to land between
nomadic peoples and farmers (Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016).
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Nevertheless, the Nigerian case of ethnic party banning is promising due to the federal
character built into party regulations. Dividing and decentralizing power at the national level
has been relatively successful in enhanced inclusion of minority group member interests, it
is reasonable to expect parties that diversify in this way to produce positive results.
6.1.4

Tanzania Case

Tanzania provides an instructive case of the way spatial requirements can aid in the development of strong pan-ethnic parties. Unlike some other countries in my sample, Tanzania
has not experienced a great deal of interethnic conflict. One explanation for this phenomena
is that the country is composed of over 120 ethnic groups which reside in distinct geographic
regions, none of which is a dominant majority. The largest ethnic group, the Sukuma, makes
up only 13% of the population while the next largest ethnic groups make up less than 5%
(African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, 2014).
Newly independent Tanganyika and Zanzibar became the single United Republic of
Tanzania in 1977. Under single party rule, the first political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM), came about from the merging of two of the largest ethnic parties from the mainland
and the island of Zanzibar. Multiparty competition was reintroduced and added to an
amended constitution in 1992, with the stipulation of strict requirements for parties to
exhibit a national character (Norman, 2009). Tanzania’s constitutional party regulations
specify (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010):
“in addition to a ban on religious, tribal, regional and racial parties, the Tanzanian
constitution denies registration when a political association ‘advocates or intends
to carry out on its political activities in only one part of the United Republic’
(Article 20(2)). The political party law of 1992 in Tanzania stipulates that, in
order to be registered, a political party needs to have not fewer than 200 registered
members in a minimum of 10 regions, covering both the mainland and the islands
of Zanzibar and Pemba. Two parties have been denied registration for failing to
demonstrate such a national presence. ”
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Empirical evidence reveals that Tanzania has strongly nationalized parties as a results of
these constitutional requirements (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010; Lublin, 2016).
Another factor responsible for nurturing the culture of nation over tribe was the strong
push for social policies that forged an integrated Tanzanian national identity (Miguel, 2004).
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that at independence Tanzania established a socialist
economic system, ratified in the Arusha Declaration. It is likely that socialist ideology, known
as Ujamaa, which delineates the post-colonial government’s commitment to build a society
based on the core principles of equality, sharing of resources, and eliminating exploitation
of all groups, influenced the move away from identity based on religion, tribe, or language,
toward one more class conscious (Malipula, 2014). These social influences make Tanzania an
interesting case as ethnicity is less salient in Tanzania than it is in Kenya or in other more
deeply divided African states.
The constitutional ban on ethnic parties was successful in nationalizing parties, preventing ethnic outbidding when multiparty competition was introduced, and staving off conflict
between groups. The Tanzanian constitution also established free and fair elections by requiring monitoring through a bureaucratically managed,locally appointment National Electoral
Commission (Norman, 2009), with the first parliamentary by-election being held in 1994.
The legitimacy of elections is also reinforced by a history of presidents observing their term
limits, even though the major nationalized party, CCM, enjoyed electoral victories since the
inception of competitive elections. When the original CCM president, Nyerere, completed
his terms his poorly performing economic policies were gradually replaced by his successors
leading to a more liberalized, productive economy.
Tanzania offers an example of how party bans work less well to prevent conflict as
a country becomes more democratic, at least on paper, and fails to represent some ethnic
minorities through major, nationalized political parties. The regime, run by the nationalized
CCM, established and bolstered democratic institutions up to the point that its electoral
stronghold was challenged by a growing opposition. The NCCR-Mageuzi party, primarily
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made up of ethnically Chagga members, became a major contender in the months leading
up to the 1995 presidential election. The CCM targeted the opposition party by claiming
it was a vehicle for exclusively Chagga interests. Similar accusations were launched against
the mainly Sukuma party, the UDP, and the party gaining strength in the Pemba region,
CUF, as its membership was predominantly Muslim.
Tensions between opposition parties and the CCM came to a head soon after the 2000
election, in which the CUF finished as a distant second behind CCM. CUF organized protests
to challenge and overturn election results leading to a crackdown by CCM controlled government forces. At least 31 people were killed and hundreds more arrested in Zanzibar (Norman,
2009). Protests grew in size after the crackdown forcing the CCM to work with the CUF on
a reconciliation agreement in order to prevent continued unrest.
6.1.5

Kenya Case

Kenya represents an example of both the inflammatory nature of banning just one ethnic
party and the way constitutional banning with spatial requirements of inclusion can help ease
tensions. Tribalism in Kenya dates back to the colonial era. From 1920 to 1963, Kenya was
fell under the rule of the British who used the divide and rule method of governing through
ethnically defined administrative districts (Orvis, 2001). For years colonizers played ethnic
groups whom they considered a threat against one another in order to retain dominance.
The Kikuyus and Luos were primary targets of divide and rule methods owing to their large
numbers. At independence, Kenyan government was designed as a parliamentary system
with highly limited power awarded to opposition groups gaining seats in their respective
districts. In its inception as a single-party state the executive branch was given centralized
authority, including the power to appoint election monitors (Hanson, 2008).
The ethnic landscape in Kenya is made up of numerous groups (around 70), none of
which come close to majority. About 20% of the population are Kikuyu and 12% are Luo.
Around 75% of the Kenyan population is comprised of five main ethnic groups. Not only are
the groups regionally distinct, but they also engage in distinct socio-economic patterns. The
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Kikuyu, as power-holders are more educated and disproportionately in control of government and commerce. Luo economic activity is based in artisanship and trade. The Kamba
are overly represented in military offices and the Kalenjin in farming (East African Living
Encyclopedia).
The first two political parties to form before and during the movement for independence
in Kenya, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), a collaboration between the Kikuyu
and Lou tribes, and the Kenyan African Democratic Development Union (KADDU) composed of numerous smaller ethnic groups, shaped current tribal politics in the country. The
KADDU coalition resisted potential domination by the two larger ethnic groups by pressing
for majimbo federalism in efforts to protect from centralized control of government (Orvis,
2001). The KADDU opposition was short-lived. At the time of independence, forged mainly
by KANU, KADDU dissolved into the KANU party, which established the independent,
single-party state. While at first the KANU made some concession to minority ethnic group
leaders eventually KANU preferred to reward small ethnic groups through patronage and
local autonomy but cut out the Luo entirely. However, powers allotted to minority group
elites were snapped back in the 1980s after a heavy bought of economic stagnation. Several
attempted coups occurred and opposition grew up until 1990 when the regime faced demands
for democratization through competitive elections (Orvis, 2001). KANU initially responded
with repression of opposition but capitulated, leading to the first multiparty elections held
in December 1992. Despite the presence of competitive elections, the KANU used repressive
means to ensure electoral success through intimidation of opposition parties. Party development took on a distinctly ethnic character and ethnic outbidding resulted in violence up to
and after the first election, which the KANU won by only 36% of the vote.
The first instance of ethnic party bans being implemented in Kenya occurred in 1994
when the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was banned from participation in politics two years
after its establishment. The IPK enjoyed support from many Kenyan Muslims who took the
ban as a signal of repression of the group’s specific religious rights. Following the ban, and
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arrests of many IPK leaders, violence ensued as well as increased radicalism among ethnic
group members (Basedau and Moroff, 2011). The hostile reaction and radicalization that
resulted from the 1994 ban of a single party is unsurprising as the action was an affront to
the ethnic group, instead of a national effort to diversify all parties.
The constitutional ban on all ethnic parties in Kenya was not formulated until the ratification of the Political Parties Act in 2008 (Moroff, 2010). The revision to party regulations
came as a response to the violence that rocked the 2007 election in which over 600 people
were reported to have been killed (Hanson, 2008). Major protest erupted into violence over
the electoral victory of Kikuyu president Mwai Kibaki. Members of the opposition claimed
electoral mishandling and engaged in targeted assaults against Kikuyu Kenyans. The crisis drew international attention and the UN became involved in negotiating an end to the
conflict including a new coalition government as well as new party regulations to reduce
tribalism in politics.
The Kenyan Constitution provides a threshold similar to that of the Nigerian constitution, requiring successful candidates to win a plurality of the vote overall as well one-quarter
of valid votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces(Reilly, 2006). Party regulations in
Kenya are well-enforced. Political registration requirements are monitored by institutions
regularly checking party platform and memberships for conformity with the law, in terms of
quotas for national membership (Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann, 2010). Kenya’s 2013
election was peaceful.
The push away from ethnic divisions in politics appears to have been met with public
approval. A 2012 news article from the International Justice Monitor reports that “close to
two-thirds of Kenyans are opposed to ethnic groupings that some politicians are using to
mobilize support and votes for elections scheduled for early next year, a new opinion poll
shows” (Maliti, 2012).
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6.2

Ethnic Party Bans in Action: Failures

Constitutionally established ethnic party bans can count as failures in the situation in which
bans either created more unrest or simply failed to reform party structure to produce a
reasonable degree of multiethnic collaboration. The are two clear obstacles to party ban
effectiveness. The first lies in the failure of the state to deny registration to ethnic parties
that do not become more inclusive. When ethnic parties can easily circumvent requirements
to diversify outbidding cannot be curbed. The second issue with bans is that, in almost
all cases, it is difficult to deal with ethnic parties that are already firmly established. A
constitutional change that requires diversification can lead to recruitment efforts by an ethnic
party, but there are examples of ethnic elite strongarming members and terrorizing voters
of other groups to gain support by force.
6.2.1

Algeria Case

Algeria provides another example of failure of the constitutional banning of ethnic parties.
Though, in the Algerian example, ethnic outbidding was not a matter of tribe, as the country
hosts one vastly dominant, fairly homogenous, ethnic group, Berbers identifying as Arabs,
at 90% of the population and a small population of Turkish, French/European, and SubSaharan African groups. Outbidding instead occurred as a clash between religious and secular
ideologies. Basedau et al. (2007, 624) highlight the special challenge to party regulation
posed by Islamist parties, some with goals to undermine democratic institutions once in
power, which was precisely the situation in Algeria.
Post-independence, from 1962 until the mid-1980s Algeria was a single-party, military
state run by the National Liberation Front (FLN), the party that was at the helm of the
liberation movement to establish and independent Algeria from French colonial rule. A major
downturn in the state-run economy, sparked by falling oil prices, led to growing public unrest
which boiled over into violence in 1988. The opposition consisted of a split between liberals
waiting for economic and political freedoms and Islamists critical of a “Western-oriented
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secularized elite” (Mortimer, 1991). The unrest led to FLN loosing its grasp of the state and
subsequent constitutional revision that “accorded the right to form ‘associations of a political
character’ and dramatically revised the political geometry by depriving the FLN of its status
as single party” (Hafez, 2000, 578). The Islamists soon after established the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS), filed for legal recognition and were a certified party in 1989, despite another
new constitutional revision on party bans that prohibit “intolerance, sectarian practice, and
parties organized on an exclusively confessional basis” (Mortimer, 1991, 580). The reasons
why the FLN did not invoke this provision to prevent the registration of the FIS party
is unclear, but it is speculated that the then president feared more violent retribution for
repressing party competition.
In 1990 Algeria held its first multiparty election which the FIS won handily. The FIS rise
to power was unsettling both to the FLN, who no longer controlled the state, and to liberals
who feared that the legitimate election of an Islamist group would threaten freedoms even
more than the former military regime. Upholding the results of a majority rule election was
considered a formidable step toward democratization, though many feared that with Islamist
in control of government other essential democratic freedoms would be in jeopardy. Despite
the trepidation, the FIS gained support not only from those identifying as Islamist, but also
from those disillusioned by the FLNs repressive control over government. Furthermore, the
proliferation of more moderate parties on the liberal side led to split in support among those
leaning left.
Local elections occurred for parliament in 1991. According to international observers,
extreme gerrymandering occurred which favored the FLN in an obvious way. To reinstate the
FLN’s dominant political position, the National People’s Assembly engaged in a process of
severe redistricting. The redistributions overly represented rural and less populated regions,
strongholds of the FLN, effectively rigging the election which drew criticism from all parties,
even liberals concerned about the FIS rise to power. The FIS nonetheless swept the local
elections as well (Mortimer, 1991).
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Matters became worse shortly after the legislative elections as the FIS was ousted in a
military coup in 1992. The military government immediately banned the future participation
of the FIS in electoral politics and harshly suppressed tens of thousands of its members and
supporters. This move pushed the more radical faction of the FIS into rebellion, lead to the
assassination of President Boudiaf, and began a civil war that would last 10 years (Aljazeera).
The political climate worsened in the lead-up to the 1996 elections. In 1996, after one of
the many attempts made to negotiating peace in the region, the constitution is modified to
officially, and very specifically, ban political parties “founded on a religious, linguistic, racial,
sex, corporatist or regional basis” or “violating the fundamental liberties, the fundamental
values and components of the national identity, the national unity, the security and integrity
of the national territory, the independence of the country and the People’s sovereignty as
well as the democratic and republican nature of the state”. Unfortunately, the ban was
circumvented by the new Islamist party on the scene, the GIA, composed of veterans of the
Afghan jihad. Based on information gathered from a human rights report released by Human
Rights Watch, Islamist parties responded to new requirements for multiethnic inclusiveness
by threatening and intimidating other ethnic group members to coerce votes. In fact, “during
the 1995 presidential elections, the GIA was reported to have threatened ‘a bullet for every
ballot’ ” (Human Rights Watch).
The failure of ethnic party bans to prevent violence, in this case, has to do with the
nonspecific nature of what counts as an ethnic or particularist party and the failure of the
FLN to apply the ban to the FLN during the first election. The party regulation had no
spatial requirements and, in this unique case of ethnic group configuration, it is not clear
how those spatial distributions would be applied. Finally, it is reasonable to think that
the Islamist threat to peace is qualitatively different than that of ethnic minority groups
seeking representation through extrainstitutional means. The Algerian problem with violence
appears to be more ideological in nature and perhaps has different causes and requires
different prevention methods.
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6.2.2

Djibouti Case

Djibouti is another case in which constitutional party regulations fail to prevent interethnic
conflict in politics. The problem is one of lacking specificity in constitutional language, enforcement and the presence of well-established ethnic parties with long histories including
dominance through military rule. Another intervening factor, in the Djibouti case, involves
the historical and political context of prior ethnic war and weak, less than democratic institutions. Additionally, Djibouti faces the challenge of housing two main ethnic groups, Issa
and Afar, one of which comprises a 60% majority (Issa). The stability of Djibouti is further
challenged by its precarious geospatial location among a neighborhood of failed or failing
states. I suspect that, even if implemented, spatial requirements for incorporating minorities
would not necessarily solve the issues between the two main ethnic groups (East African
Living Encyclopedia).
Ethnic configuration of Djibouti is as follows. Somali ethnic group, Issa, makes up 60%
of the population, the Afar 35%, and the remaining 5% of the population is made up of
people of Ethiopian, Yemeni, Arab, French, Italian and other ethnicities. The two larger
ethnic groups reside in distinct regions. Afar people live to the west north of the Gulf of
Tadjoura in sparsely populated areas; Somali, or Issa, live in the capital and southeastern
quarter of Djibouti (Encyclopedia Britannica). Afar language is restricted to Afar areas
and Somali is spoken widely throughout the region, though, French and Arabic remain the
official languages. Ninety percent of Djiboutians are Muslim (Sunni). Djibouti is one of the
most urbanized country in Sub-Saharan Africa, which offers it a higher degree of stability
in some sense. However, considering both main ethnic groups have strong ties with Issa and
Afar living in neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, Djibouti ends up being a refuge for
many refugees and economic migrants coming in waves to flee persecution or severe economic
downturns in their home countries.
Unlike the path to independence taken by many African countries which necessarily
involved coordinated resistance to colonizers, the people of French Somaliland (or at least
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the ethnic minority, Afars) enjoyed certain privileges from colonization. Under French rule,
for instance, Djibouti maintained its own legislature and representation within French parliament and achieved internal self-governance by 1957. Djibouti citizens were allowed to
participate in a vote for a French referendum to remain an overseas territory of France. The
vote was decided with both the Afar and European population of Djibouti by 60%, while
Issas overwhelming voted for independence. The Issa, in fact, petitioned for independence
much earlier with a campaign beginning in 1947. On 27 June 1977, the Republic of Djibouti
became an independent state. The newly independent government opted for single- party
rule in effort to prevent disintegration along tribal affiliations. The Popular Assembly for
Progress (Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres; RPP) was established in March 1979
and Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who was President of the Republic at that time, was appointed
its first President and Afar leader Ahmed Dini as prime minister. Less than a year later,
Aptidon dismissed the government and replaced the prime minister with another Issa elite,
Hamadou. In backlash, the Afars formed their own political party, Djibouti People’s Party
(PPD) lead by former prime minister Dini, which was quickly banned and repressed from
activity.
To solidify his power, and that of the RPP, Aptidon adopted nine constitutional articles
in 1981, establishing that the president is head of state, nominates a prime minister, and may
serve five-year, unlimited terms. Noncompetitive elections would also determine members
of a National Assembly composed of 65 RPP members. Abstention from voting only legal
form of opposition.
An Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD),
launched a guerrilla war against Issa domination in 1991. Major gains by the Afar resulted
in talks between the Issa controlled government and the Afar opposition.France remained
intimately involved in the process, witholding economic aid in order to force ruling regime
and opposition to the negotiating table (Brass, 2008). The talks resulted in the development
of a new constitution and a power-sharing agreement which split power between the Issas
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and Afars and allowed for multiparty competition, limited to four political parties. The new
constitution also included party regulations which prohibited exclusively ethnic parties from
registration, spelled out in Title I Article Six in 1992 Djibouti constitution:
“Political parties shall be instrumental in the expression of the suffrage. They
shall be formed and carry on their activities freely in respect for the Constitution and the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. They shall be
prohibited from identifying themselves by race, ethnic group, sex, religion, sect,
language or region. The formalities with respect to registration of political parties
and the exercise and cessation of their activities shall be determined by law.”
In 1993, Aptidon won a fourth six-year term in Djibouti’s first contested presidential
election, which was considered fraudulent by international observers (Freedomhouse Report).Ahmed Dini became prime minister. In 1994, the largest FRUD faction agreed to end
its campaign in exchange for inclusion in the government and electoral reforms (Freedomhouse Report). Djibouti has continued to experience clashes between the two large ethnic
groups, mainly as a consequence of repression, authoritarian control by the dominant ethnic
group, despite the regime’s persistant claims that Djibouti is moving in a more democratic
direction (Schermerhorn, 2003).
The ethnic party ban ratified in Djibouti’s 1992 constitution has failed to prevent violent
conflict for several reasons. Most importantly for my argument, the constitutional regulation
failed to include a design to nationalize parties. Had Issa leaders been required to secure
the votes of a proportion of Afar citizens, Afar people would have had representation in
government and not have to resort to boycotting elections or violent unrest. A host of
other circumstances including residing in an unstable region, having two large ethnic groups
divided by a long history of colonization, and environmental/population crises only serve to
make matters worse in terms of interethnic cooperation.
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Chapter 7

Conclusion
This chapter will present a review and summary of the research presented in this dissertation.
I begin with my primary argument for the value of constitutional ethnic party bans in
preventing conflict between ethnic groups in deeply divided societies. I then summarize the
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) theory of collective choice in plural societies and outline my
original extension to the model. Next, I discuss my empirical contributions including the
collection of new data on ethnic party bans, utilizing novel measurement modeling techniques
and dealing with endogeneity through methods of causal inference for observational data.
This follows with a discussion of findings and implications of these findings. Finally, I offer
recommendations for policy and future research.
Ethnic party competition in deeply divided societies poses a threat to peaceful relations
between ethnic groups. Institutional engineering designed to articulate ethnic party interests
can offer a cushion for the clash between ethnic groups but proves difficult to sustain. Articulation may safeguard democratic stability, but cannot ease tensions between ethnic groups.
Many forms of aggregating ethnic group interests into multiethnic coalitions through electoral institutions exist with some evidence of success. Most conceptualize the usage of party
bans as a mechanism of blocking ethnic group representation. I have presented the argument that constitutional banning of ethnic parties is, instead, an effective institutional tool
for aggregating ethnic group interests to create multiethnic cooperation along other social
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dimensions.
My theoretical framework has built upon Rabushka and Shepsle (1972)’s original model
of collective choice in plural societies. My expectation that ethnic outbidding will follow
ethnic party formation, leading to greater levels of violent conflict follows from Rabushka and
Shepsle (1972)’s assumptions that ethnic elite will drive group preferences toward extremism.
I extend the model by examining the impact of ethnic party bans, expecting that bans force
ethnic elite of minority parties to moderate in order to recruit multiethnic collaborators.
I expected the move toward moderation to decrease violence, but added that nonviolent
protest would become a more attractive tactic for ethnic group members to achieve goals
specific to ethnic group interest. Finally, I explain the way ethnic group dynamics can be
altered depending on the strength of democratic institutions, expecting that ethnic parties
with the opportunity for representation would engage in less violent conflict and ethnic
groups banned from the opportunity to represent their own group’s specific interests would
engage in more conflict.
The large-N empirical examination I conduct to predict levels of violence and protest
among ethnic groups attends to a few main shortcomings in quantitative analyses that preceded my investigation. First, Ishiyama (2009) expresses uncertainty with regards to whether
ethnic parties lead to higher levels of violent conflict or protest based on finding mixed results between models and raises concerns that the positive association between violence and
ethnic parties could be driven by reverse causality. Ishiyama (2009) does not assess the
effectiveness of ethnic party bans to pacify unrest. This question is posed in Basedau and
Moroff (2011) for a sample of African countries implementing “hard” ethnic party bans and
shows that, in most cases, ethnic groups engage in equal levels of violent conflict before and
after enforcement of bans.
My research design deals with the issue of mixed results by tending to discrepancies in
results between Ishiyama (2009)’s original models. By using the same MAR data, I employ a
measurement modeling technique as my empirical strategy (alternating least squares optimal
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scaling) to achieve the best fitting model suggested by the data. Conducting a time-series
cross-sectional analysis, including a lagged variable approximating prior violence, I assert
with reasonable confidence that any violence occurring before ethnic party formation is
controlled for, therefore not driving the relationship between party formation and unrest.
My models include an ethnic party status focal independent variable, created from data I
collected on constitutional ethnic party bans, to compare the effect of ethnic party bans
on ethnic group conflict against average conflict produced by groups with ethnic parties.
Finally, I address plausible endogeneity issues that may arise in the event that contextual
features of countries would make them both more prone to conflict and more likely to place
bans on ethnic parties. To allay these concerns, I employ a new method propensity score
weighting that can balance multiple treatment groups on the characteristics that can prove
to be problematic.
The analysis I have conducted confirmed my expectation that ethnic group parties are
more prone to escalating violent conflict, regardless of electoral institutions established to
facilitate their success. In comparison, ethnic groups banned from forming ethnic parties
engage in significantly less violent conflict. In countries with higher levels of democracy,
ethnic party bans do not perform as well to prevent escalating violence, though democracy
makes little difference to groups with ethnic parties. When analyzing levels of protest,
the results disconfirm my expectations that ethnic groups with bans would engage in larger
peaceful demonstrations. Instead, I find that ethnic parties are also involved in a significantly
higher level of protest activity.
My results do not produce mixed results with respect to the relationship between ethnic
party formation and unrest. I instead find a consistent pattern of increased intensity in both
violent and nonviolent conflict associated with ethnic parties. The findings I present also
provide evidence to dispel the notion that higher levels of violence prior to party formation
is driving force behind the association between ethnic parties and conflict. The relationship
between ethnic party bans and unrest is less consistent. In most cases, ethnic groups banned
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from ethnic party formation behave like other ethnic groups that also do not have ethnic
parties, while groups with parties engage in more conflict.
Overall, the evidence does lend credence to the theory of ethnic outbidding. Ethnic
parties engage in more extreme, violent actions, all else being equal. Ethnic party bans
specified in constitutions seem to work to prevent this extremism from developing. Ethnic
party bans do not appear to significantly reduce conflict for ethnic groups, but this does not
mean that they do not “work”. Even if ethnic bans do not drastically cut down on group
violence, they seem to prevent the spiraling of violence stemming from ethnic party affiliation, which is their primary function. The effectiveness of ethnic party bans in producing
peace counteracts claims that bans will cause ethnic group members to rebel against lack of
representation. However, the significant interaction between increasing levels of democracy
and increases in violent action among groups banned from ethnic party formation suggests
that bans could cause legitimacy problems in environments where access to government positions for minority ethnic groups is more likely as large multiethnic parties fail to include
or actively block ethnic minority groups from participation.
Results of my analysis do not support my claims about ethnic group participation in
protest. While I assumed that ethnic groups banned from forming particularist parties
would be less prone to extremism and would instead turn to peaceful demonstrations to
achieve group gains, these groups are even less likely to protest than rebel, as compared
to ethnic groups with parties. One possible explanation is that the two types of unrest,
violent and nonviolent, are simply two similar tactics both utilized by groups that consider
regular institutional channels insufficient to meet their demands. I expected that ethnic
parties with very intense preferences for ethnic group gains would turn to extremist tactics
of violence. But perhaps only some individual members of the ethnic group select this tactic,
while others choose peaceful resistance. Another explanation is that I underestimated the
mobilization potential of ethnic parties. If party organization is necessary to mobilize ethnic
group members in either protest or violence, ethnic groups without parties may not have the
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resources to coordinate large demonstrations.
The main goal of my inquiry was to determine if ethnic parties produce greater unrest,
and if so, whether or not constitutional bans on ethnic party formation dampen this effect.
By examining my research question through an institutionalist lens, I avoid the problematic
assumption that ethnic antagonisms are static without ignoring how “sticky” ethnic identity
can be in societies with long histories of ethnic divisions. An additional advantage of this
theoretical approach is the ability to explain ethnic conflict through both elite and mass
level behavior. My research also offers a critique of methodological tools, providing new and
revisited techniques that allow more room for the data to advise on matters of measurement
and correction of bias.
Constructivist scholars have been too quick to dismiss the value of ethnic party bans,
treating the practice as an affront to ethnic group representation by imposing constraints on
ethnic identity. But, just like consociationalism, or any institutional method of articulating
ethnic group interests at the government level, bans that require a political party to meet a
threshold of membership inclusive of other groups is another tool to manage cleavages in a
way that maintains stability in new democracies. Ethnic group leadership must prime group
members to compromise with outside groups which not only cools the intensity of preferences
for exclusive group gains, but also prepares group members for the compromises inherent in
democratic politics, lending legitimacy to budding democratic institutions. Based on the results presented above, I conclude that constitutional ethnic party bans are low cost, effective
mechanisms for aggregating ethnic group interests by requiring collaboration with members
of other ethnic groups to gain multiethnic political representation. Even “soft” party bans
appear to quell unrest among ethnic groups as compared to those involved in ethnic parties. Blocking parties from developing along exclusively ethnic lines is not the equivalent of
preventing ethnic identity from shaping political landscapes. Chandra (2005, 247) describes
the recognition of ethnic identity as a basis for political mobilization to be “a democrat’s
joy–creating a self-sustaining multiethnic democracy by letting multiple majorities check and
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balance one another”. If this process can work within national democratic government, it
should be just as stabilizing at the intragroup level of the multiethnic political party.
My recommendations for future research are as follows. First, as my expectation that an
ethnic group’s level of preference intensity, based on ethnic party affiliation, would influence
the choice of violence versus protest did not pan out, it would be interesting to take a look
at the difference between these two types of unrest. The model I presented required some
restrictive assumptions concerning uniform preferences among ethnic group members that
do not necessarily reflect the complexity of intragroup dynamics. With access to more finegrained data at the individual level, one could analyze the effectiveness of mobilizing ethnic
group members, whether it be to vote, protest, or fight.
It would also be interesting to examine variation in the make-up of parties formed
based on spatial requirements and multiethnic quotas. For instance, do ethnic group elites
attempt to recruit only the minimum number of members from other ethnic groups or do
strategies include consolidating entire groups together? How difficult is it to find loopholes in
constitutional bans that would impact their enforcement? If the party is primarily composed
of one larger ethnic group does leadership advance the goals of this group over others, is there
a critical mass of minority group members required for those interests to be met, or are these
divisions largely downplayed?
Politicizing ethnicity presents real problem for new, developing democracies. To counter
threats to stability and peace a slate of institutional tools have been devised to ease interethnic tensions in deeply divided societies. Constitutional banning of exclusively ethnic parties
is one method of aggregating social cleavages to produce multiethnic coalitions at the party
level. To date, little empirical evidence has been offered on the effect of banning ethnic parties has on ethnic conflict. In this dissertation I present evidence that points to the positive
effects bans can have on diffusing conflict between ethnic groups. By carefully attending
to issues of measurement validity and endogeneity I present well-fitted models that reduce
the potential for biased results. Upon closer examination of cases of ethnic party banning it
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appears that constitutional bans with built-in federalist designs work better than others. I
also find that bans do not work as well in countries that already have well-established ethnic
parties prior to competitive elections.
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University of Kentucky, May 13th-16th, 2015
“Visions in Methodology Conference 2014” at McMaster University, May 20th-22nd,
2014
“Journeys in World Politics: Women in International Relations” sponsored by the National Science Foundation at the University of Iowa, November 17th-20th, 2011

Selected
Conference
and
Working
Papers

“Tracking Flow Processes of Terrorist Organization Networks: Reassessing Centrality
Measures for ‘Dark’ Networks”
“Developing Rule of Law Measures with Public Opinion Data” (with Christopher Hare)
prepared for the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association,
New Orleans, LA.
“Ethnic Parties, Bans, and Civil Unrest” prepared for the 2014 International Political
Science Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, QC.
“Building Out of the ‘Conflict Trap’: The Role of Legal Institutions in the Prevention
of Civil War Recurrence” Prepared for the 2012 Midwest Political Science Association
Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois.
“Precipitants of the Ethnic Riot: A Hierarchical Analysis of Structural and Proximate
Causes” Prepared for the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Chicago, Illinois.
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